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
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## KEYNOTER

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#### FROM THE APIC PRESIDENT

This issue takes a look at a critical year for American politics, 1964. It was a precedent-shattering campaign with bigger than life figures like Lyndon Johnson, Barry Goldwater, George Wallace, Robert Kennedy, Nelson Rockefeller and more. During that campaign, the Eastern Establishment of the Republican Party that had provided Republican candidates from Theodore Roosevelt to Dwight Eisenhower lost control of the party, never to get it back. On the Democratic side, Lyndon Johnson put his brand on the nation with one of the greatest landslides in history. George Wallace exploded out of the South in a foreshadowing of his 1968 independent candidacy and strains of American populism from that year are still evident in the election of 2016.




When 1964 was over, American politics had changed forever. In this issue we look at two fascinating stories from that complex political year.

First, George Wallace's campaign in the Democratic presidential primaries was one of the final steps in a process of departure by the traditional Democratic heartland in the conservative South from the Democratic Party of the Confederacy to the Republican Party of Lincoln. That shift was echoed by a contrasting move of the African-American voter from an overwhelming Republican voting pattern to one every bit as heavily Democrat. Today, once-heavily Democratic white ethnic blue collar men have moved solidly into the Trump camp. The Wallace campaign of 1964 was a step in that shifting process.

Then there's Bobby Kennedy's capturing a U.S. Senate seat from New York, despite not being a New Yorker, which opened the way for Hillary Clinton (born in Illinois, resident of Arkansas) to win a Senate seat in New York. RFK's 1964 victory laid the groundwork for his doomed presidential run in 1968 and is a significant part of the Kennedy political legacy.

Ron Perechan

Ron Puechner, President



#### **EDITOR'S MESSAGE**

As I write this, the 2016 election is less than a month away and it has been an amazing spectacle. Many of the social forces described in the cover story about George Wallace's 1964 campaign have come back on steroids this year. It has



been a year that threatens to totally restructure the historical Republican Party. Are we seeing something akin to the shattering of the Whig Party in the 1850's? Many readers will recall how the old Whigs tried to hang on as the American ("Know Nothing") Party and Republican Party battled to emerge as the alternative to the dominant Democrats.

The 1964 Wallace campaign was a sign of how the Democratic Party, long standing on the two legs of Southern conservatives and Northern liberals, was heading for change. So, too, the Trump campaign may well foreshadow a very different Republican Party.

Having been a Republican activist during major change elections like 1964 and 1994, I am well aware of how strong is the habit of party identification and I am not one to flippantly predict the demise of a major institution. In recent decades, the Republicans have been the strongest party with control of Congress, the Supreme Court, most governors and state legislatures.

How will that stand on November 9?


It is likely that by the time you read this, the answer will be evident. One way or another, this year will be one for the record books.

Mr. Khy Michael Kelly

Editor

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FRONT COVER-- Time Magazine cover from September 27, 1963

**ILLUSTRATIONS--** The editor wishes to thanks the following for providing illustrations for this issue: Lon Ellis, John Hughes, Chris Hearn, Harvey Goldberg, Robert Fratkin, Gene Dillman, Heritage Auctions, David Quintin.

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If you don't have access to a scanner or high-resolution digital camera, you can take your items to graphic service bureaus, such as Kinko's, and have them scanned in the specification mentioned above. You can then send the file by e-mail, on a CD or on a zip disk. If sending by zip disk, please supply return address.

#### LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

As usual I am enjoying the current Keynoter. I am always pleased when it arrives and look forward to a pleasurable read. As I was looking at the Nixon poster on page 22 I tried to identify as many likenesses as possible. Although I am likely wrong I keep seeing Ed Brooke and not Joe Louis above Nixon and beside Dirksen. I thought I would ask (in case I am correct!).

Ron Pimentel (APIC #14574)

The person identified in your article (A Big Tent Poster) on p.22 as "boxer Joe Louis (above Nixon and beside Dirksen)" is, in fact, Massachusetts Senator Edward Brooke, mentioned earlier in the article.

Randy Ostrow (APIC #8528)

[Editor's note: Our sharp-eyed readers are correct. The picture in question was identified both as the Massachusetts Senator and the famed boxer at different places in the text but the image on the poster was Senator Brooke.]

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# Wallace in 1963-1964: Onto the National Stage

#### By John Vargo

Literally from the day in January 1963 that George Wallace took office as governor of Alabama, he made clear his intention to be deeply involved in the presidential campaign of 1964. His inaugural address is most known for its full-throated defense of the Jim Crow racial system of the Deep South, and particularly for its proclamation, "I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." That is not all that Wallace said related to race, and, indeed, a biography that is relatively sympathetic to him – Stephan Lesher's George Wallace: American Populist – asserts that in the speech, Wallace "spewed a litany of racism."



However, Wallace did much more in that address, and in particular he set out how he intended to carry out his campaign in behalf of the racial prerogatives of the white South, including in the next presidential campaign. Soon after his pronouncement on segregation, Wallace asserted,


[W]e intend to take the offensive and carry our fight for freedom across this nation, wielding the balance of power we know we possess in the Southland . . . that WE, not the insipid bloc voters of some sections [i.e., black voters in the North], will determine who shall sit in the White House of these United States . . . . [Emphasis added.]


In this passage and others, the speech contemplated a two-pronged approach: uniting the South behind a traditional "states' rights" platform, and reaching out to sympathetic voters in other parts of the country and enlisting their support as well. For example, the next couple paragraphs were devoted to individuals who lived outside the South but who were "of the Southern mind, the Southern spirit, and the Southern philosophy . . . ."

The speech also made clear the nature of the campaign Wallace intended to wage. While the basic purpose was to defend the racial system of the Deep South, there was nothing at all defensive about the campaign he envisioned. Rather, it was a campaign of attack, with the target being the federal government. Particularly in his sights were the federal courts, which had been issuing orders requiring desegregation of public schools and universities, and the federal executive branch, which, beginning with the Eisenhower Administration, had been enforcing those orders when necessary. The speech dripped with contempt for those institutions and expressed the ultimate fear that the U.S. would become "a mongrel unit of one under a single all powerful government." When, in mid-1963, President Kennedy proposed a sweeping civil rights bill, Wallace easily shifted the focus of his attack to that legislation.

Politically it was clearly beneficial to Wallace to characterize the issue as a fight between freedom and federal tyranny, because that approach tended to take the spotlight off of Jim Crow – including the fundamental impact of the system, which was the subjugation of blacks by whites, and the reasons that the system had such an iron-clad grip on the Deep South. Among those reasons were the general denial of voting rights to blacks, and the intimidation of and the often-fierce retaliation against individuals, whites as well as blacks, who sought change. Moreover, in view of Wallace's purposes, targeting the federal government made perfect sense, for it had been clear since Reconstruction that the federal government was the only institution that possessed the power to effect change in the racial laws and practices of the South.

Yet while the Jim Crow South was the focus of national media attention at the time, an important aspect of the Wallace story in 1963 and 1964, as we'll see, is that racial segregation and discrimination were definitely not confined to the South. It is true that in the North and other regions, there were no "white only" or "colored only" signs, and segregation there was not required by law or backed up by the immense police power of the state. In addition, by and large, blacks there had full voting rights. Nevertheless, the segregation and discrimination outside the South – particularly in the key, related areas of housing and schools – were very real,





and by the early 1960s, they were the target of civil-rights activists in many parts of the country. There were a number of factors underlying these conditions in the North, but the fundamental reason for them, to put it bluntly, was the suspicion and fear, if not outright hostility, that many whites felt toward blacks.


By mid-1963 Wallace had made moves to implement both prongs of the approach to the 1964 presidential election that he had set out in his inaugural address. With regard to the selection of unpledged states' rights electors by all the states of the South, Wallace gave his full support to the campaign for that purpose that was initiated by the Southern Committee to Help Elect the Next President of the United States, which was headquartered in Jackson, Mississippi. Both Wallace and Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett headlined the committee's kickoff dinner in Jackson on June 17, 1963, which, according to news reports, raised \$15,000 for the campaign. The committee's plan did not envision an independent or a third-party presidential candidacy. Rather, the plan was that the Democratic Party in each southern state would take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that with regard to its 1964 presidential electors, state party members would have the option of selecting an unpledged states' rights slate, which the committee referred to as a slate of "free electors." Underlying the plan were the assumptions that the 1964 Republican presidential nominee would be a liberal, and that the 1964 election would be a close one, just like 1960 had been. The plan was that if a sufficient number of such free electors were chosen in the southern states, neither of the major party candidates would be able to gain a majority of electors, and the southern electors would have the power to decide who the next president would be. The South would thereby be in a position to bargain for the support of its electors in exchange for concessions on states' rights.

Wallace continued to advocate the free-elector plan well into 1964, and he was able to implement the plan in Alabama. However, for reasons that will become clear, Alabama was the only state in which it was implemented. Nevertheless, there was a fair amount of interest in the plan at the outset, and in the spring of 1964 the Southern Committee actually expanded its activities to include fundraising for Wallace's campaign in the Democratic primaries. In mid-1963 the committee sent a packet to its "charter members" that consisted of informational materials and three display items, a member's certificate emblazoned with the Confederate battle flag, pictured on the next page, and two large-size bumper stickers. That Wallace was correct in claiming that the South

had supporters in other regions of the country is indicated by the fact that this particular packet was sent to an individual in southeastern Pennsylvania.

At about the same time, Wallace began to articulate his plans to reach out to other parts of the country for support, and those plans were ambitious ones. They envisioned Wallace taking on President Kennedy in the 1964 Democratic presidential primaries in one or more states for the purpose of showing significant opposition to Kennedy's efforts on civil-rights, and thereby weakening Kennedy's candidacy in the November election.

In the time prior to the Kennedy assassination, Wallace publicly stated – first indirectly and later directly – that while he had not yet made any final decisions, he was seriously considering such a course. The states most often



mentioned were Indiana and Maryland, and those were two of the three states in which he ultimately did run in the 1964 presidential primaries. Other states mentioned as possible sites for a challenge included New Hampshire, Ohio and California. Wallace backed up the talk of a possible run in the primaries by beginning, in the fall of 1963, to travel extensively around the country. His standard itinerary included speeches on university campuses and to civic organizations, as well as press conferences and participation in TV and radio interview shows.

By the fall of 1963 Wallace had gained considerable national attention both for his uncompromising defense of segregation in Alabama and, beginning mid-year, his vehement opposition to the Administration's proposed civil rights bill. While he was unsuccessful in preventing the integration of the University of Alabama in June 1963, the public images of his "stand in the schoolhouse door" fully accorded with his strategy, for they showed him squaring off, not against the black students whose admission had been ordered by the courts, but rather a Kennedy Administration official who was seeking to implement that order. In addition, one month earlier, in May 1963, the media were filled with images of civil rights demonstrators in Birmingham, many of them children, being attacked with high-power fire hoses and police dogs. While the decision to use those tactics was made at the local level, rather than by Wallace, he publicly expressed his full support for that decision. As a general matter, Wallace was contemptuous of the civil rights movement, referring to it as being Communist-inspired and led.

In late summer of 1963, news reports began to appear about the huge amount of mail Wallace was receiving from around the country commending him for his stand, with many urging him to run against President Kennedy. Among the letters that were shown to reporters, one stated the writer's vow not to vote for "Martin Luther Kennedy" in 1964. Another (from Brooklyn) asserted that while "The Negroes had Lincoln and Kennedy" as their champions, with Wallace, "at last we have a champion of the



white people." The news reports also stated that Wallace's office was using the letters to create a state-by-state database of supporters.

In sum, as Wallace began to travel around the country, he was hardly an unknown figure. Instead, his appearances often attracted a combustible mix of fervent admirers and those who absolutely abhorred what he was saying and doing. When he appeared on university campuses, however, he often found relatively few supporters, but many hecklers and hostile pickets. On some campuses, the opposition took the form of an angry, threatening mob.

In mid-September 1963, Wallace traveled to Maryland, one of the prospective primary states, to participate in a locally tele-

vised panel discussion on race relations at a Baltimore-area college. An article on his appearance in the *Baltimore Sun* of September 14, 1963 noted that several women who greeted him were wearing "Welcome Wallace" buttons. It appears an example of that button has not yet surfaced in the hobby, although it is possible that they were home-made items. While Wallace generally showed a great deal of skill in his public speaking during these trips, the same article noted a slip-up during the panel discussion. In claiming that communication between the races was good in Alabama because blacks and whites live near each other, he "point[ed] out that from the Governor's mansion, 'I can throw a rock out the window and hit six Negro houses.'"

The Maryland trip came in the midst of a turbulent month in Alabama, which had begun with Wallace attempting, ultimately unsuccessfully, to thwart court orders to begin the integration of public schools in four Alabama cities, including Birmingham. In those efforts, Wallace was acting in opposition to not only to the courts and the Kennedy Administration, but also to the local officials in the four cities, who had agreed to those plans. There were a number of instances of white violence against blacks in



Birmingham in that period, and on September 15, 1963, one of the most heinous crimes of the civil rights era occurred there: the Sunday morning explosion of a dynamite bomb at a black church that killed four young girls. The September 27, 1963 issue of *Time* magazine carried a cover article on Wallace, but particularly striking is the cover artwork, in which a portrait of Wallace was juxtaposed with an image of one of the stained-glass windows of the Birmingham church. The window had been damaged in the blast in such a way that Jesus' face was obliterated. The cover can certainly be interpreted to assign Wallace a share of the blame for the church bombing, and it wouldn't be going too far to say that it can be interpreted as depicting Wallace as an antichrist-like figure.

One of Wallace's responses to the criticism then being directed at him was an in-depth interview that was published in the Baltimore Sun of October 20, 1963. The interview took place in part in his home in Clayton, Alabama, and an interesting aspect was the extent to which he stressed was that his conflict with Kennedy was entirely political and not at all personal. Wallace claimed that he had "the highest regard for him and his family" and cited his past support for Kennedy, including for his candidacy for vice president at the 1956 Democratic Convention. According to Wallace, he had "escorted his sister to the Alabama delegation so she could speak in his behalf," and he himself had voted for Kennedy on the decisive second ballot. He also pulled a copy of *Profiles in Courage* from his bookshelf and showed the reporter the inscription, "To Judge George Wallace, with very best wishes, John Kennedy."


In early November 1963 Wallace undertook a major and certainly a very bold out-of-state trip – a several-day visit to JFK's New England that was centered on appearances on Ivy League campuses. The first was at Kennedy's alma mater, Harvard, and the others were at Dartmouth, Smith and Brown (Yale had invited him as well, but the invitation was later rescinded). The tour was a personal triumph for Wallace, as those expecting to see an old-style redneck spewing racial epithets were entirely disappointed. Instead, he performed extremely well on the stump, and he was easily able to parry the students' hostile questions by showing a quick wit and a sense of humor. Within a few years, however, college students would acquire a much sharper edge and many would become intolerant of even the expression of other views.

Within two weeks of Wallace's return from New England, President Kennedy was assassinated, and by all appearances, Wallace was deeply troubled by the act. He attended the funeral in Washington and wrote a letter of condolence to Mrs. Kennedy that went well beyond the obligatory. In hindsight, it is clear that the assassination had major impacts on Wallace's efforts in the 1964 presidential campaign, both near-term and long-term. An immediate impact was that Wallace declined further invitations until the first of the year, and thus his campaign-related efforts were put on hold in the critical period just prior to the start of primary season.

In January 1964 Wallace picked up about where he had left off in mid-November 1963. With President Johnson having adopted enactment of the civil rights bill as a top priority, Wallace resumed promoting the free-elector plan and reiterated his interest in running in the Democratic presidential primaries in a number of states. He also resumed his extensive tours of the country in trips that were largely centered on visits to university campuses. In January he made a tour of California, Oregon and other western states (he appeared at UCLA as part of the university's Distinguished Speakers Series), and in February he made a similar tour of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ohio and other states of the Midwest. A book that covers those trips notes that as part of Wallace's Midwest tour, he made a speech to a large crowd in Cincinnati, and afterward his staffers passed out "Wallace souvenir coins" to supporters. It seems likely those coins were distributed at his other appearances as well, and, indeed, similar souvenir coins were a staple of Wallace's 1968 campaign materials catalogs.

By February, at least two states that Wallace had been considering for a primary challenge – New Hampshire and Ohio – had been ruled out. New Hampshire had been an inviting battleground in 1963 in that it was in Kennedy's backyard, but that consideration no longer applied. In mid-January 1964 a political columnist suggested another reason that Wallace might skip the state: his entry might undermine Senator Goldwater's candidacy in the Republican primary and hence benefit Governor Rockefeller. Ohio had to be ruled out because Wallace simply did not have the time or the resources to meet the requirements for access to the ballot. Those requirements were far more burdensome than those of most other states, and they had to be satisfied by the relatively early date of February 5th. (In 1968 Wallace's American Independent Party was able to gain access to the Ohio ballot only





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by challenging the state's ballot-access requirements in court and prevailing in a case that was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court.) One other key primary that Wallace skipped was California, but the reasons he did so are not clear. In mid-April 1964 a respected nationally syndicated newspaper political column reported that Wallace's decision was based on discussions he had had with California Governor Pat Brown when both were in Washington for President Kennedy's funeral, but neither would reveal the substance of their talks.


In early March, Wallace entered his first presidential primary, and it was in a state that had not been part of any of the earlier discussions or speculation: Wisconsin. The visit that Wallace had made there in February as part of his Midwest tour played a critical role in his entry. While there, his staff was contacted by a husband-and-wife team of longtime Wisconsin conservative activists, Dolores and Lloyd Herbstreith. They made a strong argument that circumstances in the state were such that Wallace could do quite well in the Democratic primary, and they offered to take the laboring oar. Wallace accepted their offer, and on March 6th, which was the final day for filing, he returned to Madison to declare his candidacy. The disclaimer on locally issued Wallace bumper stickers identifies Dolores Herbstreith as Chairman of the Wisconsin Wallace effort (although the 13/16" "Wallace for President" lithograph name buttons that were also used there bear no disclaimer at all).

Wallace's entry into Wisconsin was followed three days later by his entry into the Maryland primary, which he announced in appearances in Baltimore and Annapolis. Near the end of March, he entered the Indiana primary, and with that action, his "dance card" for the 1964 presidential primaries was complete. In contrast to Wisconsin, both of Maryland and Indiana had been discussed as possible sites for challenges since mid-1963. Wallace began campaigning in Wisconsin in mid-March, and thus his journey through the primaries was about two and a half months in duration. Wisconsin voted first, on April 7th, Indiana voted about a month later, on May 5th, and Maryland voted on May 19th.



The course and the results of Wallace's campaign in each of the three states bore a number of similarities, and his efforts in the primaries are perhaps best understood by looking at those similarities. First, the focus of his efforts throughout the primaries was his attack on the civil rights bill that President Johnson and his administration were then seeking to have the Congress enact. By the time Wallace began his campaign, the bill had already passed the House (on February 10, 1964) and was pending in the Senate, where the outcome was by no means certain. Thus in entering the Wisconsin primary, Wallace asserted that his purpose "was to tell the truth about the so-called civil rights bill." Upon entering the Maryland primary, he declared, "We are going to conduct a massive education campaign" regarding the bill.

In his speeches, Wallace invariably referred to the bill in apocalyptic terms, asserting, for example, that its enactment would destroy both "the private enterprise system in this country" and "the right of free ownership of private property." The bill's public accommodations section, he claimed in Maryland, would let the Federal Government "take over every business in this state." He there went on to predict that if the bill were enacted, it would be repealed in "two to four years." However, it appears this kind of rhetoric was not reflected in the literature or other items issued by the Wallace campaign. The campaign did issue at least two tabloid booklets on the bill that were probably used in all three primaries, but with their dense text, they are more consistent with the



notion of conducting an educational effort. One, entitled "Unmasking the Civil Rights Bill," is fourteen pages and consists largely of excerpts from the dissenting views of six members of the House Judiciary Committee that were published in that committee's report on the bill. The other, which was issued earlier in the campaign, consists of the bill's text and a critique of the legislation made by two prominent attorneys.

Second, even though the Johnson Administration's civil rights bill was the target of the Wallace campaign, President Johnson himself was not on the ballot in any of the three states. Instead, in each, Wallace's opponent was a prominent Democrat holding statewide office who was acting as a stand-in or a surrogate for LBJ: Governor John W. Reynolds in Wisconsin, Governor Matt Welsh in Indiana, and U.S. Senator Daniel Brewster in Maryland.


A major reason LBJ abstained from the primaries is that during the spring of 1964, he was in an extended "honeymoon" period with the press and public, and he was having considerable success in implementing his agenda. Thus in that period the White House adopted, outwardly at least, an entirely "non-political" attitude, and that approach clearly ruled out LBJ participating in the primaries. This, however, was not the only reason LBJ declined to take up the Wallace challenge. For example, a *Baltimore Sun* article in March 1964 stated that in the fall of 1963 President Kennedy's staff had considered whether he should enter the Maryland primary if Wallace filed there. Their answer had been no, for the reason that "entering the President would dignify the Wallace candidacy, and that Mr. Kennedy should not 'get down in the dirt' with the Alabama Governor." The article went on to say that in the view of party leaders, those considerations applied as well to President Johnson.

On the other hand, the use of stand-ins meant that their candidacies on behalf of LBJ would be weighed down whatever personal liabilities they had, and each had some major ones. One of the liabilities of Maryland's Senator Brewster is shown on a postcard that is pictured here: his endorsement of Louis Goldstein in the hotly contested race for the Democratic nomination for U.S. Senator. Certainly that endorsement alienated Goldstein's opponent, Joe Tydings, and his supporters, and in the primary, Tydings bested Goldstein by nearly two-to-one.

Third, not only the Johnson stand-ins, but also the religious leaders and union leaders in each of the three states, launched

harsh attacks against Wallace, condemning his views and his record, and particularly his all-out defense of racial segregation. Thus, for example, in mid-March, the newspaper of the Milwaukee Catholic Archdiocese carried an editorial that referred to Wallace as a "moral evil [that] is invading our state," and at about the same time the newspaper of the Baltimore Catholic Archdiocese referred to Wallace as "a law-defying racist" and urged voting against him. As to the stand-ins, Wisconsin's Governor Reynolds, in his initial response to Wallace's candidacy, referred to him as "a symbol of probably the worst part of our society" and called for rejection of "Governor Wallace and his immoral philosophy." Among other things, Indiana's Governor Welsh likened Wallace's Alabama to Hitler's Germany, asserting that both promoted a doctrine of "racial superiority," and that in both there was "bombing of churches, burning of schools and beating of citizens."

Major campaign leaflets issued for Reynolds and Maryland's Senator Brewster reflect such attacks on Wallace, albeit in somewhat more temperate language. In contrast, the two most widely circulated items for Governor Welsh, a button and a die-cut card, are exclusively devoted to his role as a stand-in for LBJ and are not anti-Wallace in any way. Of all the items issued for the 1964 Democratic primaries, these Welsh items continue to be the most readily available, indicating that they were made in a large quantity. (The content of an uncommon LBJ-Welsh poster is about the same.) However, a book by Wallace's press secretary at the





SEN. DANIEL BREWSTER of Maryland listens to early returns in Democratic presidential primary election in his home state and though he has a margin over his opponent, Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace, he is anything but pleased. (AP Wirephoto)

time (Bill Jones's *The Wallace Story*) describes two other items issued by the Welsh campaign that were extremely negative. One was a full-page anti-Wallace newspaper ad that was published throughout the state, the theme of which was "Don't let hate win in Indiana," and that cited the Kennedy assassination and the Birmingham church bombing. The other was an anti-Wallace "fact sheet" that was issued by a group calling itself "the "Indiana Group for Responsible Government."

Fourth, despite the negative portrayal of Wallace in the mainstream media and the harsh attacks that his opponents made against him, in each

of the three states, the size of the vote garnered by Wallace astounded political observers and dismayed Democratic Party leaders and civil rights activ-



ists. In Wisconsin on April 7th, Wallace received over one-third of the Democratic total. (At the start of the campaign, Governor Reynolds was


quoted as saying that if Wallace received even as many as 100,000 votes, it would be a tragedy, but Wallace received over 266,000 votes.) He fell somewhat short of that percentage in Indiana on May 5th, receiving 29.8 percent of the Democratic vote. The greatest shock, however, was Maryland on May 19th, where he received nearly 43 percent of the Democratic vote.

Wallace's surprising showing in Wisconsin was particularly important both because it gave credibility to his candidacy in the two subsequent primaries, and because it prompted a major increase in campaign donations, enabling the campaign to expand its advertising buys. The "bandwagon" effect of the Wisconsin vote is promoted on the back of a Wallace brochure that was issued for the Indiana and Maryland primaries. As to campaign finances, the book by Wallace's press secretary, Bill Jones, states that while the campaign had to borrow money to buy TV ads in Wisconsin, contributions began to flow after that, and Wallace television, radio and newspaper advertising was particularly heavy in Maryland. One apparent source of the funds, as noted above, was the organization that was promoting the free-elector plan, the Southern Committee to Help Elect the Next President. In April 1964 the committee did a mailing to its members noting that it had already made contributions to the Wallace campaign, and advising that with the Wisconsin results, it had taken the further step of placing an ad soliciting contributions for Wallace in about 30 newspapers throughout the South.

Analysis of the returns establishes that in all three states, the major source of Wallace's strength was essentially the same. It was white ethnic, working and middle-class neighborhoods that were located near black neighborhoods, and that hence had begun to experience rising racial tensions. Many voters in those neighborhoods were, at a minimum, quite concerned about the demands of local civil rights activists, whether for integration of schools or of

**DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY-MAY 19th** neighborhoods, or for expanded job opportunities for blacks, and they expressed that concern through their votes for Wallace. For example, one of Wallace's best performances in Wisconsin was in the Polish neighborhoods of Southside Milwaukee, which in the 1960 presidential primary had gone overwhelmingly for John Kennedy. In contrast, Wallace did not do well in the conservative, rural areas that did not have and were not near any sizable black population. In Indiana, a bell-wether was the city of Gary, located in the northwest corner of the state. At the time Gary was heavily industrialized and unionized and was therefore a Democratic stronghold, and it was also about 40 percent black. Wallace carried every single white precinct in Gary, and he thereby won the county in which it is located, Lake County. He carried as well an adjoining county, Porter.

> The Wallace vote in Maryland was due in part to the same factors, but it was enhanced by two factors not present in Wisconsin or Indiana. One was that Maryland is a border state, and the politics of much of its rural areas were more like those of the South. That point is illustrated by the fact that in 1963 Maryland had enacted a law prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations, but exempted from that law





were twelve Maryland counties, including nearly all of those on the Eastern Shore of the Chesapeake Bay. The second distinguishing factor was that beginning in 1963, one city on the Eastern Shore - the city of Cambridge - had been the scene of major protests against the segregation of its restaurants and hotels, and those protests had escalated into racial violence so serious that the National Guard had to be called in to restore order. Not surprisingly, Wallace won all nine counties on the Eastern Shore, and he also did well in the tobacco-growing areas of southern Maryland. Overall, in view of the motivation of the Wallace voters in all three states, it is entirely possible that he actually derived some benefit from all of the harsh verbal and written attacks, and the picketing and protest of his appearances. For those voters, those attacks served primarily to identify him as one who shared the serious concerns they had about the civil rights movement and its agenda.

After Wallace's run in the primaries was over, some commentators asserted that if LBJ had not used stand-ins for those primaries but instead had run himself, the vote for Wallace would have been far smaller. One prominent political column acknowledged that claim but asserted nevertheless

SUPPORT PRESIDENT JOHNS The World watches Maryland! JOIN MARYLAND'S MARCH FOR JOHNSON AND JUSTICE. A vote for Dan Brewster is a vote against BIAS, BIGOTRY and INTOLERANCE! SUPPORT THE MEN WHO WILL DO THE DANIEL MOST FOR MARYLAND. Auth. Herbert R. O'Conor. Jr. Treas. BREWSTER VOTE FOR DANIEL B. BREWSTER DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY MAY 19th DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY MAY 19th, 1964

that for the sake of the civil rights bill, it was better for LBJ to stay out. According to that column, LBJ "undoubtedly would have cut deeply into the Wallace vote. But even a vote as low as 20 percent – all of them Democrats – against the President himself might have a far more explosive impact that a 40 percent vote against a proxy." Another key point here is that for voters who favored, and benefitted from, the policies of the national Democratic Party other than those favoring racial integration, their votes for Wallace were "cost-free." That is, they had no potential cost to the voter because it was clear that with his three-state campaign, Wallace was not going wrest the nomination from President Johnson.

Two buttons used in the 1964 Democratic primaries were noted above: the 13/16" lithograph "Wallace for President" name button that was used in the Wisconsin primary, and likely in the other two states as well, and the 3" celluloid Welsh-LBJ name button from Indiana. There have been lengthy discussions on the



APIC Facebook page on whether there were any other Wallace buttons issued in 1964. This is a difficult question, because as shown by the Wallace paper items pictured here, his 1964 campaign used the same candidate portrait and the same "Stand Up for America" slogan that were used


on materials issued for his far more extensive campaign in 1968. In those collector discussions, there was general agreement that two other buttons date from 1964: a  $1\frac{3}{4}$ " celluloid name button with images of the American flag and the Confederate battle flag, and a  $3\frac{1}{2}$ " picture button that has the manufacturer's name, the A. G. Trimble Co., on the curl. However, no information on where or how those buttons were used has yet surfaced. There may be other Wallace buttons that originated in 1964, but thus far no evidence establishing that point, such as news

STAND UP FOR

AMERICA

photos or campaign documents, has been located. Two other "wearable" items from the Maryland primary have come to light. One is a diamond-shaped Brewster May 19th lapel sticker that was pictured in the Spring 1993 Keynoter. The other is a rectangular sticker or tag reading "Official Wallace Worker." These can be seen on the jackets of a couple men in a news photo (one on the left, and the other behind Mrs. Wallace) that was taken during the primary-night celebration at Wallace headquarters.

While Wallace was running in the primaries, he by no means disregarded the second prong of his strategy for 1964, the plan to have "free" electors chosen in each of the southern states. Indeed. Wallace selected a slate of such electors to run in the Alabama primary on May 5th, and the material issued for his slate included at least two palm cards. On the same evening that Wallace received the news of his strong showing in Indiana, he also learned that his slate in Alabama had overwhelmed a "loyalist" slate that was committed to the presidential ticket that would be selected at the Democratic National Convention in August. While the unpledged-elector slate prevailed there, thus denying LBJ a place on the Alabama ballot in November, the circumstances illustrated one of the major obstacles to adoption of the free-elector plan in other southern states. That is, for one reason or another, a large number of Democratic Party leaders throughout the South were



Wallace with LBJ at a Washington Meeting of governors.

reluctant to break with the national party. This was particularly true of the U.S. Senators and Congressmen who feared losing their seniority or committee assignments as a result of disloyalty to the party's presidential ticket. Thus in Alabama, the "loyalist" slate was endorsed by both of the state's U.S. Senators, John Sparkman and Lister Hill.

The final nail in the coffin of the free-elector plan was the nomination of Senator Goldwater for president by the Republican National Convention on July 15th. As noted above, one of the assumptions underlying the plan when it was formulated in early 1963 was that the Republicans would nominate a liberal, but that did not occur. Goldwater had all but clinched the Republican nomination with his June 2nd victory in the California primary, but throughout the remainder of that month and into July, Wallace gave every indication that he would be a candidate in the November election. To do so would require that he go well beyond the free-elector plan and become an independent presidential candidate in some states. That Wallace was serious is indicated by the fact that in late June, his team conducted a massive effort in North Carolina that qualified him for a place on that state's November



George and Lurleen Wallace at a 1964 rally in Maryland.

ballot. On July 4th, Wallace spoke to a raucous segregationist rally in Atlanta and stated his intention to be a presidential candidate in sixteen states, the vast majority of which were southern or border states.

Nevertheless, on July 19th, the Sunday after Goldwater's nomination, Wallace announced that he was terminating his candidacy for president. According to the Bill Jones book, people who otherwise might have supported Wallace had gone to Goldwater instead, and his funding sources were drying up. Moreover, if he stayed in the race, he and Goldwater might split the anti-integration vote in southern states in such a way as to allow LBI to win some of them. Possibly an even more serious concern was that Goldwater might outpoll him in the South. In two other states that had shown interest in the free-elector plan, Louisiana and Mississippi, the Democratic Party did not select its presidential electors until September, and that resulted in bizarre party meetings in both. Party leaders in both states were by then open in their support of Goldwater, and they did not want to


name a states-rights slate that would compete would compete with the Republican slate of electors for Goldwater. Thus both chose a slate of electors pledged to the Johnson-Humphrey ticket. This occurred even though, according to an Associated Press story, "Goldwater buttons and stickers blossomed" at the Mississippi Democratic State Convention on September 9th, and in Louisiana, the meeting of the State Democratic Central Committee on September 12th concluded, according to a New York Times report, with committee members "pick[ing] up Goldwater bumper stickers and campaign buttons" while signing a declaration of support for the Republican candidate.


Despite Wallace's strong showings in the 1964 primaries, the ways in which his presidential-campaign efforts had ultimately failed are readily apparent. Most obviously, on July 2, 1964 President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law, and its provisions were actually quite a bit stronger than what the Kennedy Administration and most observers had believed possible in 1963. Had President Kennedy not been assassinated, the Wallace candidacy might well have had an impact on the course and the terms of the bill. But ironically, several factors arising from his death operated to put the bill out of Wallace's reach. One of them was the elevation of Lyndon Johnson, who very much wanted to create a legacy of his own that included meaningful action on civil rights, and who was more than willing to exercise his extraordinary legislative skills to that end. Another was new public attitudes and beliefs – widespread, albeit clearly not universal – that idealized President Kennedy and looked with distain on those who had demonized him during his presidency. It should also be noted that one factor critical to the bill's enactment had remained constant, and that was the support for the bill by Republicans in the House and the Senate who saw protection of black rights as part of the party's heritage.

Second, the free-elector plan as implemented in Alabama was a disaster. With Goldwater as the opposition, the unpledged slate was, to borrow an expression, an echo rather than a choice, and that echo did not even have an active presidential candidate. Goldwater won the state with nearly 70 percent of the vote. Moreover, whereas previously the Alabama

delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives had been all Democratic, in 1964 the Republican tide in Alabama elected the party's candidate in five of the state's eight congressional districts.


**Notwithstanding** those setbacks, these early Wallace efforts in national politics clearly paved the way for more expansive efforts in the future. Wallace had shown himself to be an effective campaigner in areas far from home, and he had begun to build a loyal national constituency. In the years that followed, that constituency that would grow considerably, largely as a result of the massive changes American society and politics that were just starting to become apparent in 1964.











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## RFK in '64: Finding His Own Path

#### By John Vargo

By virtually all accounts, in the early months of 1964, Robert Kennedy was consumed by grief and despair over the shocking death of President Kennedy. In an instant he had lost not only a beloved older brother, but also what had become his life's work; to serve John Kennedy's political career as his closest confidante, advisor, advocate and, as the need arose, his ruthless enforcer. The team had reached the pinnacle of American politics and RFK had gone on to serve his brother in a similar capacity atop the government. Now, all that was gone.



RFK felt a strong commitment to the policies that the Kennedy Administration had advocated and the approach to governing that it had embodied. Basically, he and the Kennedy loyalists saw the New Frontier as an important generational change in government. Its hallmarks, in their view, included questioning past policies and practices, being energetic and imaginative in fashioning and implementing new policies – particularly in the critical areas of race relations, foreign and military policy, and the economy with an overall a commitment to excellence. They viewed politics and public service as honorable pursuits and smart politics were the means by which to create smart policy.

In the loyalists' view, the tens of thousands of young people who President Kennedy had inspired to enter politics and public service were perhaps the best indication that the New Frontier had become an important political force and RFK was determined that this force would not die. Loyalists saw RFK as the natural successor to his brother as its leader, a role he aspired to fill. But the obvious question in early 1964 he faced was how to get there.

By the end of 1964, RFK was U.S. Senator-elect from the State of New York, a state he had never before claimed as his residence and in which he hadn't even been eligible to vote for himself. In hindsight, it is clear that this office was an ideal one for him to pursue becoming a national political leader. In the early months of 1964, that outcome was not so apparent.

It is not at all surprising that in the first

half of 1964, Kennedy was simply unable to focus on his career plans. Hence he was often indecisive and inconsistent, and at times showed poor judgment. One possibility to which he devoted an undue amount of time and attention was becoming Presi-





dent Johnson's vice-presidential running mate. There was considerable support among rank-and-file Democrats for a Johnson-Kennedy ticket, and efforts to draft RFK sprang up around the country (there are at least five different RFK for vice president buttons from 1964). However, in view of the longstanding, deep enmity between the two men – as well as LBJ's desire to win the presidency on his own without any Kennedy help – that possibility was both extremely remote and, so far as RFK's long-term interests were concerned, a probable dead end.

The Kennedys had already shown how easy it was to marginalize a vice president and how unlikely that RFK would have been able to use that office to advance his own agenda. In any event, LBJ would have offered him the nomination only in the unlikely circumstance that he needed RFK's help to win the election. About the only instance in which that could have occurred was if the Republicans had nominated a Northeastern moderate. Barry Goldwater's nomination in mid-July ended whatever slim chance there had been that he'd be offered the nomination. In late July LBJ personally informed Kennedy that he was not going to be selected and the next day, Johnson publicly revealed his decision in a rather clumsy way (eliminating the entire cabinet) to give the impression that Kennedy wasn't being singled out for rejection.

Even stranger was Kennedy's interest in being named Henry Cabot Lodge's successor as Ambassador to South Vietnam, characterizing the conflict there as "the most important problem facing the United States." RFK later told Newsweek magazine of his interest in becoming Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State – offices that would also enmesh him in the Administration's

Vietnam policy – or Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Kennedy also considered running for an elective office other than vice president, focusing on the U.S. Senate seat from New York. He asked one of his confidants to prepare a memo setting out the considerations on his running for either the New York Senate seat or governor of Massachusetts. While the memo concluded that Kennedy could easily win the race for governor, it also set out many negatives of his holding that office and that alternative was quickly discarded.

Regarding the New York Senate seat, the memo acknowledged that "carpetbagging" would be a nagging issue (RFK then lived in Virginia and voted in Massachusetts) and there were other hazards. Nevertheless, it concluded that he would likely win by a comfortable margin. Another aide then conducted a more detailed analysis and reached the opposite conclusion: that Senator Keating would trounce him handily.

The major responses RFK had to the carpetbagger issue were weak. One was that he had lived in New York for much of his childhood and teenage years and had gone to school there for six years. Another was that there were precedents for a candidacy such as his, but those claims were quite a stretch. On the other hand, Kennedy also had an important political



Shown reduced. Actual size 4".

asset in New York, his brother-in-law Steve Smith, who had great political contacts and much insight into the politics there.

There was little pressure on Kennedy at that time to make a quick decision. The Democratic nominee was to be selected by state convention – not a primary – and the convention would not meet until September 1. In addition, except for Kennedy, the field was not strong. Congressman Sam Stratton of Amsterdam (northwest of Albany) was a declared candidate and well-known trial lawyer Louis Nizer, a political novice, was interested in making a run. There was also significant support for Adlai Stevenson, who had lived in New York since becoming U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. in 1961, but Stevenson disclaimed any interest in running.

Nevertheless, as public speculation about his candidacy grew, and the time for decision neared, Kennedy reversed course, albeit temporarily. On June 23, he issued a statement saying flatly that he would not be a candidate for U.S. Senator. Admittedly, the circumstances were extreme. Four days earlier, his brother Ted had been seriously injured in an airplane crash in Massachusetts, raising the prospect that RFK would have to assume even greater family responsibilities. The statement did not address the reasons for the decision, but anonymous RFK aides told the media that concerns about Ted's health were not the only or even the major reason for it. Their comments had almost certainly been cleared in advance with RFK and one implication is that he viewed his decision as final.

Kennedy's non-candidacy lasted only a few weeks. In mid-July he convened a meeting of top aides at Hickory Hill, his Virgin-

ia home, and told them he was going to resign as Attorney General and make the run. What had changed since June 23? Certainly the outlook for Ted's recovery had greatly improved. RFK had also received a handwritten letter from Jackie Kennedy urging him to continue in public life. Another possible factor was that he had recently returned from a previously scheduled, one-week trip to West Berlin and Poland, where his public appearances attracted huge, adoring crowds.

At the Hickory Hill meeting, there was sentiment that he should immediately declare his candidacy and start to campaign, but the final decision was to delay the public announcement. That turned out to be a smart decision, as the way that later events unfolded tended to obscure his earlier drop-out. During the time Kennedy was out of the race, state party leaders were unable to agree on a candidate. Then, once President Johnson made his July 30 announcement that Kennedy would not be his running mate, a number of those leaders began to urge Kennedy to reconsider the New York race. Soon afterward, anonymous Kennedy allies told the news media that RFK was reconsidering. On August 12, media reported that he had told his family and friends that he was making the race.

From the time he made his decision, brother-in-law Steve Smith had begun lining up the support of the Democratic bosses from around the state. For the most part, they were so hungry for a victory that Kennedy wasn't a hard sell. Former Governor



Averill Harriman also provided important assistance but, to gain the nomination, Kennedy needed the endorsement of the most powerful Democrat in the state, New York City Mayor Robert Wagner. Wagner was a bigger challenge as he had no desire to have Kennedy as a competitor in the state's politics. Harriman asked LBJ to go to work on Wagner and, despite his qualms, LBJ did so with his usual effectiveness.

Mayor Wagner endorsed Kennedy on August 22. On the same day the Kennedys leased a mansion in Glen Cove on Long Island to serve as their New York residence. On August 25 – which happened to be the second day of the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City – Kennedy formally announced his candidacy at Gracie Mansion in New York with Mayor Wagner at his side. By the time Kennedy announced, he had the nomination locked up; the September I state convention would be merely a coronation.

There was yet a noteworthy intervening event; RFK's appearance before the Democratic National Convention on August 27 to introduce the film tribute to President Kennedy. Video of that appearance has frequently appeared in documentaries and is readily available on the internet. What was remarkable was the response

that the delegates and other convention attendees accorded him, a response that foreshadowed the crowd response when he hit the campaign trail in New York.


As described at the time, when Kennedy appeared the convention erupted into "thundering, deafening applause" that lasted, depending on the source, anywhere from thirteen to twenty-two minutes. Many in the hall revered President Kennedy and continued to mourn and miss him. Their ovation expressed those feelings as well as their appreciation for the vital role RFK had played in the era they had begun to view as Camelot. An observer stated, "It was by any account a tremendous cathartic release of sympathy, support, and emotion."

At the New York Democratic State Convention in New York City five days later, Kennedy far outpolled Congressman Stratton, winning the nomination by a vote of 968 to 153. Because of the Kennedy candidacy, the meeting attracted many more spectators than state conventions usually do, but the crowd was quite different from that at the national convention. According to the New York Times, the galleries "were crowded, mainly with teen-agers and young voters, and nearly all seemed to be either enthusiastically for the Attorney General or just as enthusiastically opposed to him." As to the reception accorded to Kennedy when he rose to make his acceptance speech, the newspaper described it as "a 10minute demonstration – a rollicking, noisy type of demonstration," and it went on to assert that it was thus "wholly different in character from the solemn peals of applause that greeted him in Atlantic City."

The newspaper coverage of the state convention is also interesting because of its references to or photos showing Kennedy campaign items there. Ethel Kennedy was there with seven of her children as well as a number of her nieces and nephews, and many of the children wore "a huge [6" size] campaign button which read, 'Let's put Bob Kennedy to work for New York'." In addition, in a newspaper photo showing the convention stage, several people can be seen wearing a  $3\frac{1}{2}$ " size "Robert F. Kennedy for U.S. Senator" name button with dark letters on a white background, and a small ribbon suspended from the bottom. Thus these buttons were likely the first to be used in his Senate campaign.

Another newspaper photo of the convention floor shows posters with a picture of RFK and the same "Let's put Bob Kennedy" slogan used on the 6" size buttons. Brochures using this slogan are not uncommon, but they use a different picture of Kennedy – one in which he's in shirtsleeves. The picture on the posters used at the state convention is one showing him in a suit jacket. In any event, the slogan was later changed to "Let's put Robert Kennedy to work for New York," on the view that "Bob" or "Bobby" sounded like the name of a little brother.

Because of the scheduling of the state party conventions, the Kennedy-Keating race had duration of a little more than two months. When the campaign began, polls showed Kennedy with a healthy lead. The fall campaign can be viewed as having two phases. The first lasted until early or mid-Oc-



tober, and in it, Keating steadily narrowed the gap in the polls and then surpassed Kennedy. In the second phase, Kennedy made a comeback, winning the race with 53.5% of the vote to Keating's 43.4%. (The candidate of the New York Conservative Party took about 3% of the vote.) While that was a solid win, it was nowhere near President Johnson's performance in the state. LBJ took 68.6% of the vote there, and his vote count exceeded Kennedy's by more than a million.

The most important reasons for these two major swings reflected important changes in the campaign. However, there were also several key factors in the campaign that remained essentially the same for its entire duration.

To begin with, the carpetbagger issue was raised throughout the campaign in a variety of forms. One reason it was particularly hurtful to Kennedy is that it played into his reputation for ruthlessness – in this case, so the claim went, his running roughshod over real New Yorkers in order to gain a




stepping stone for higher office. The Keating campaign cleverly exploited the issue by issuing a variety of items with the slogan, "Keep Keating – New York's Own!" A number of different "Bobby Go Home" buttons were also issued, and there's little question they were from the 1964 campaign. According to a late September newspaper article on a Kennedy campaign motorcade heading uptown in, at one point an office worker leaned out the window and yelled the kind of greeting one might expect in

New York at that time: "Go back to Boston, ya bum!"

CONNECTICUT
CARPETBAGGERS
FOR
KEATING

One of the more unusual items relating to the issue is a  $1\frac{3}{4}$ " name button with the wording, "Connecticut Carpetbaggers for Keating." A October 30 newspaper article reported that during the prior morning's commute, the buttons had been passed out by volunteers at a number of train stations in Connecticut that were departure points for the trip into New York City. According to the article, "It's all a tongue-in-cheek ploy on the part of some commuters who work and pay taxes in New York but cannot vote for Mr. Keating."

Another campaign constant was Senator Keating's largely liberal record in the Senate, which made him a viable alternative for liberals alienated from Kennedy by the carpetbagger issue or







Actual size 3-1/2"

Actual size 3-1/2"

# MY MOM & DAD ARE FOR BOBBY





Actual size 3-1/2"



Actual size 3-1/2"









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**DEMOCRATS FOR KEATING** 

other considerations. Keating had also opposed the Goldwater nomination and refused to endorse him, although he also refused either to endorse President Johnson or to reveal how he would vote for president. In mid-October the traditionally liberal New York Times strongly endorsed Keating over Kennedy; carpetbagging and Keating's record were key reasons for its stance.

In the same vein, since his election to the Senate in 1958 Keating had assiduously courted Jewish voters, who were a key part of the Democratic coalition in New York. RFK was at a disadvantage among them because of his father's record on Germany in the early Hitler era and RFK's reputation for ruthlessness. Post-election analyses showed that Kennedy received 60 percent of the Jewish vote, which was about 10 percent below the Democratic norm. Other Keating strengths were that he had the full support both of Governor Rockefeller and his political machine and of his Senate colleague, Jacob Javits.

However, Keating's liberalism also carried a price, and that was the opposition of pro-Goldwater Republican conservatives. The New York Conservative Party, which had been formed in 1962, gave them a means to express themselves with ballots. As noted above, they nominated their own candidate for the U.S. Senate, Henry Paolucci, an associate professor of history and political science at Iona College. A button was issued for him in the party's familiar orange and black colors but he remained a little-known figure. The Conservative Party challenge to Keating could have been far more serious for, until the day before the party's nomination was to be made, former Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce had been a candidate. Luce, who had bedeviled both FDR and Harry Truman, would have been a far more formidable candidate than Paolucci. A range of prominent Republicans urged her not to run and she finally succumbed to the pressure.

One other constant throughout the campaign was the huge, frenetic crowds Kennedy drew practically everywhere he went in the state. On many days, the unexpected crowds at his early stops put him hours behind schedule, but the delays didn't at all diminish the crowds at his later stops. They wanted to see him, touch him or shake his hand. The motorcades became a physical ordeal for Kennedy because of people grasping for him from the sea of humanity and often staffers had to cling to his legs to make sure he wasn't accidentally pulled from the car. Wild scenes like these are most often associated with his 1968 presidential campaign but they were also very much a part of his 1964 campaign.

Longtime political commentator Joe Alsop wrote that this phenomenon was not "mere curiosity," but instead it could be explained only by "admiration and indeed by love – the same love and admiration that still brings thousands to Washington every weekend [to visit] President Kennedy's grave." However, there was another aspect to the crowd response that the anti-RFK New York Times highlighted in its campaign coverage. For example, in a campaign run-down published on October 9, the Times wrote that "women and girls...predominate in the [Kennedy] crowds" and that he could evoke "shrieks of pleasure" from them "simply by running his hand through his tousled hair." Several days earlier, in an article about his campaigning on Wall Street, the Times wrote that women "screamed ecstatically" when Kennedy moved among them, and that the crush around him was so intense that "several women were bowled over and nearly trampled." After he left "Wall Street looked like a boulevard of broken heels" and lost shoes.

The *Times* coverage suggested that Kennedy's large crowds and the fervid crowd response were basically celebrity-driven, a variation on the Beatlemania that had swept the country early in 1964. Certainly that was part of the explanation, but as indicated both by the reception accorded to Kennedy at the Democratic National Convention and the Alsop observations, it almost certainly was not the full explanation. The celebrity/Beatlemania aspect of Kennedy's appeal is reflected in a  $3\frac{1}{2}$ " celluloid name button with the wording, "I Like 'Bobby' Kennedy – Yeah! Yeah! Yeah!" That button, which likely was marketed by vendors, was based on one of the Beatles' early hits, "She Loves You."

Turning to the two major phases of the campaign, the first, as noted above, lasted something more than a month and saw Keating overtake Kennedy in the polls. Why the change? The change probably wasn't as dramatic as it seemed, for the early polls likely overstated Kennedy's strength.



Actual size 3-1/2"

In the polls taken in August and earlier, he was probably aided by public sympathy for him and the novelty of his candidacy, factors that would rapidly diminish.

Still, the fact that Keating had gone into the lead indicated that Kennedy was having difficulty with some of the groups that comprised the Democratic coalition, and their grievances with him are not difficult to discern. To begin with, Adlai Stevenson had been the first choice of many Democratic liberals as well as the *New York Times* itself. It certainly didn't help that the newspaper was bitterly opposed to Kennedy. While it didn't formally endorse Keating until mid-October, it had published editorials in May and August that were harshly critical of Kennedy. In addition, many Reform Democrats – those who sought to rid the state party

of boss rule – were hostile to RFK because he was being supported by major party bosses (as John Kennedy had been in 1960) and the Kennedys reciprocated their support.

Those grievances and others were highlighted by the well-publicized formation of a Democrats for Keating committee in September. Among the celebrities who joined were actor Paul Newman, novelist and playwright Gore Vidal, and writer and black activist James Baldwin. In early October Keating claimed that nearly 20 Democrats for Keating organizations had been established in the state and those organizations were likely responsible for the Johnson-Keating buttons that appear in the hobby in at least three varieties, as well as a 3" size cloth patch. Such "split-ticket" presidential campaign items are quite unusual, with the only others that come to mind being the 1932 Texas Roosevelt-Garner-Bullington name button and the 1948 Ohio Dewey-Lausche name button.

While these Democrats' efforts were generally very helpful to Keating, they also resulted in an embarrassing incident. Late in the campaign it came to light that Jimmy Hoffa's Teamsters had funded the establish-



ment of Democrats for Keating-Johnson-Humphrey offices in black neighborhoods of New York City. The union had also paid for 100,000 copies of a campaign newspaper titled "The Dispatch" that was highly critical of Kennedy's civil rights record. On October 29, VP nominee Hubert Humphrey appeared with RFK at a huge rally at New York City's Garment Center, and a copy of the newspaper had been given to him beforehand. (Originally LBJ was to appear at the rally, but HHH was a late substitution.) Humphrey effectively used the newspaper as a prop, waving it in the air and terming it a "new low in politics." He went on to say, "You know what you should do with this kind of material? Tear it up! Throw it away!" Then in a flourish he tore up the copy he had been holding and threw the pieces in the air like confetti.

Another factor in Kennedy's September slide was his decision that he should refrain from attacking Keating or seeking to debate him. The rationale was that either of those steps might end up underscoring Kennedy's reputation for ruthlessness. As one of his aides put it, "You can't get anywhere attacking Grandpa," referring to the white-haired, normally mild-mannered Keating. Yet another factor was that the Kennedy campaign did not begin television advertising until early October. Indeed, the campaign would have been unable to begin effective advertising any earlier than that as it wasn't until then that the campaign was able to devise a format for its commercials.

With the campaign nearing its midpoint at the end of September, how was Kennedy able to turn things around by Election Day? The most obvious change he made was to reach out and take a firm grip on LBJ's coattails. With polls showing Johnson with a commanding lead in the state, this change made obvious sense. With the plethora of Johnson-Kennedy and Johnson-Humphrey-Kennedy buttons, stickers and other paper items, this aspect of the campaign is most apparent to collectors. Items that refer to the "Johnson-Humphrey-Kennedy team" are unusual in the extent to which they tie the separate candidacies together. They came close to making it appear that the presidential ticket was a triumvirate. Apparently in response, the Keating campaign issued items boosting the "Keating-Javits Team."

Yet the coattail items are only part of the story. At least as important were the joint appearances of the candidates in New York. LBJ campaigned with Kennedy twice while HHH campaigned with him on three other occasions. But the joint appearances with LBJ came at a personal price to Kennedy as LBJ would agree to campaign with him only upon a direct personal request from Kennedy.

Another factor that benefitted Kennedy greatly was the start of his TV advertising. / Much of the film for the commercials was made at a question-and-answer session he had had with students at Columbia University on October 5. He was hit with a series of tough questions and answered them directly, succinctly and with humor. The resulting commercials greatly increased his voter appeal, or as Kennedy put it in an interview published after the election, they "showed that I was something more than a Beatle."

One other factor in the turnaround was that Kennedy began both to attack Keating's record and to seek to debate him, but only after a serious provocation from Keating. In late September, Keating gave a speech in which he claimed that Kennedy as Attorney General had approved a settlement of a financial claim from World War II on terms that provided a payoff to a "huge Nazi

cartel." The charge was baseless, as even the pro-Keating Times acknowledged. Kennedy was outraged, and not long afterward he began launching attacks on Keating's voting record (some of which likewise strained credulity).

It may be that the matter of debates was the coup de grace for Keating. For much of October both candidates insisted they wanted to debate but were at loggerheads over the format. Keating adamantly rejected the now-familiar format of the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates. On October 26, Keating announced he had bought a half-hour of time from the local CBS station for a debate and that, if Kennedy didn't show up, he'd debate an empty chair. Kennedy did show up at the last minute but guards at the studio wouldn't let him in. The media visuals could not have been worse for Keating, as they showed him debating an empty chair while Kennedy was on the street knocking on the studio door, asking to be let in.




Sen. Keating at his "empty chair" debate.


A major biography of RFK published earlier this year appears to be on solid ground in claiming that the Senate campaign "proved [to be] the best therapy for his broken life." Ironically, while his basic purpose in running had been to carry on the legacy of the New Frontier, the beliefs and outlook he began to develop as a candidate differed from those of his brother, including in RFK's greater willingness "to experiment with radical solutions and spend political capital." This was particularly so on issues that hit him on a "gut level," including black rights and battling poverty. He would continue to develop his political beliefs in his three and a half years in the Senate, and would become a bitter opponent of a man who had been a major benefactor of his 1964 Senate race, President Johnson.

For the most part, the information inb this article on the collectibles is from the excellent reference book on RFK campaign items that was issued in 2011 by Harvey Goldberg and the Kennedy Political Items Collectors.












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
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














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
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


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## **Grays Harbor Stamp Works**

#### By John C. Hughes

The material culture of American politics is especially rich in Washington State, due in no small part to Grays Harbor Stamp Works. The hundred-year-old company has produced many sought-after campaign buttons, including a rare Truman pin and several unique FDR's.

Rubber stamps and all manner of engraving jobs have long represented two-thirds of the company's business, but its reputation as a high quality button-maker reaches far beyond Aberdeen, a coastal timber town 100 miles west of Seattle. Operating from a nondescript storefront on a quiet side street, the third-generation company has customers all over the nation. It was honored as the industry's US "Manufacturer of the Year" in 2000 and 2009.

Ron, Dave and Ken Windell began working with their dad and uncle as teenagers. "Someone said that for all of us to work together for so long, with no visible cuts or bruises, must say a lot," Ken quips. They take pride in their workmanship. It's unusual to see a Grays Harbor Stamp Works pin with faded inks.

After button-wearing Democrats staged a tumultuous state convention in Aberdeen in 1936, the Windell brothers' grandfather bought the button machine that's still a mainstay at the Stamp Works. With a dexterity acquired through decades of practice, Ron Windell operates the clacking contraption that marries a celluloid-covered button-paper to its collet and pinback. When he's on a roll he can crank out 700 to a thousand per hour. "It's a working museum; that's what it is," says Dave Windell, pointing to a Heidelberg press from the 1950s. Around the corner, however, there's a laser engraver.

Over the years, Grays Harbor Stamp Works has produced hundreds of thousands—possibly a million—pinback buttons, as well as rubber stamps and all manner of imprinted goods, from coffee mugs to name tags. From its earliest days, the company's status as a union shop gave the Stamp Works a lucrative niche around Western Washington, the liberal side of the Cascade mountains. On a recent visit, the Windells were finishing up an order of dues buttons for Electrical Workers Union Local 46 in Seattle, which placed its first order on August 24, 1938. The union "bug" on a campaign button remains a badge of honor for office-seeking Democrats.

The Washington State Democratic Party and its allies began placing button orders with Grays Harbor Stamp Works in 1939. The Washington Commonwealth Federation, a "Popular Front" leftist coalition with headquarters in Seattle, ordered 100,000 seven-eighths inch "Draft Roosevelt For '40" campaign pins with a Statue of Liberty theme (Hake 235), at \$15.50 per thousand. The handsome little pin fetches around \$35 today.

One-thousand unusual Roosevelt portrait pins (Hake 312 and 313) were manufactured by Grays Harbor





Stamp Works in 1940 for King County Democratic Headquarters in Seattle. There were 500 of each design. Interestingly, the lighter line-drawn portrait (Hake 313) is now far scarcer. Ted Hake's most recent price guide, issued in 2004, lists the lighter version at \$125 and the darker at \$150. Over the past two years, however, the lighter version has sold for as little as \$50, and the darker version for around \$75. I believe collectors confuse these pins with mass-produced lithographed pins of similar design (Hake 143 and 144). Their scarcity eventually may propel them back to the Hake guide levels.

Two highly collectible 1944 FDR pins were manufactured by Grays Harbor Stamp Works without the company's name on the

curl. "All Out For Durable Victory" (Hake 246) and the similarly styled "FR-He Saved Our Home" feature backpapers that say "designed and distributed by Edw. F. Murray, Seattle, SE(neca)-2228." Murray, an accountant, may have been just tooting his own horn. Nevertheless, the Stamp Works' union bug is on the backpaper. Cleverly designed, the buttons now sell for \$100 to \$150.







The Stamp Works also produced at least eight of the best-made anti-FDR slogan pins in 1940. Seventy-six years later, these Willkies look as bright as the day they left the shop.

The Stamp Works' ubiquitous little "It's Time For A Change" button, first produced in the 1940s, was reissued off and on for 20 years. It's never out of style.

Rarest by far of the Stamp Works' output is a 11/4-inch "True to Truman/Truman Democratic Club Of Wash. Inc." pin (unlisted in Hake). An example with unobtrusive staining went for \$1,530, including a 15 percent buyer's premium, in a 2010 Hake's Americana auction. A version with black text, rather than dark blue, sold for nearly \$1,200 in a Heritage 2007 auction, despite some edge stains. A black-on-white version—listed as 11/2

TRUE TO TRUE TO TRUMAN TRUMAN TRUMAN DEMOCRATIC TRUMAN DEMOCRATIC CLUB of WASH. CLUB of WASH. INC. INC

HENRY

SCOOP


ACKBON

RESIDENT

inches, possibly erroneously—brought \$650 in a 2014 Anderson Americana auction. Another blue-on-white example with some significant edge staining was clearly a steal at \$411 in a 2014 Hake's auction. The only near-mint example to surface in recent

years (pictured here) is a dark blue on white version in the collection of the Washington State Historical Society at Tacoma. This rare Truman pin surely must rate as the most elusive and valuable pin ever produced by a Washington State vendor. "Give 'em hell" Harry, who whistle-stopped from Spokane to Olympia in the summer of '48, went on to sweep 29 of the state's 39 counties.

Over the years, the Stamp Works produced thousands of pins for Washington's formidable Senate duo, Warren G. "Mag-




presidential contender in 1972

The Stamp Works landed an order for "Pat Paulsen For President" pins in 1968, perhaps in part because the Smothers Brothers Show comedian was born in nearby South Bend, Washington.

Recent Washington State coattail buttons produced by Grays Harbor Stamp Works include "Dukakis & Lowry, A Winning Team For Working

People" and Clinton-Gore-Locke "Washington for Conservationists."

Patty Murray, Washington's tiny yet tenacious U.S. senator, chose Grays Harbor Stamp Works to produce an iconic 21/4-inch pin for her first campaign in 1992. It features a pair of sneakers, symbolic of her being dismissed early on as just a "Mom in Tennis Shoes."




SENATOR

MAGNUSON















In 2000, the Stamp Works produced in relatively low numbers two interesting Gore-Lieberman pins. One, featuring an umbrella, declares, "Gore & Lieberman Will Reign In Washington 2000." The other has a portrait of George Washington in profile. The text says "Gore/Lieberman 2000," with "In Gore We Trust" next to George.

The Longshore union and the United Food & Commercial Workers commissioned the


Stamp Works to produce large numbers of "Dump Reagan" and pro-

ROOSEVELT WALLGREN

Mondale pins. "Out The Door In '84" features a cadaverous caricature of the president who busted the Air Traffic Controllers' union.

Notable Washington State pins manufactured by other companies include the coveted "New Deal For Cowlitz County" FDR portrait pin, which routinely tops \$200, and three coattails in the \$30 to


\$50 range. The Roosevelt-Wallgren button from 1940 helped boost New Deal Congressman Monrad "Mon" Wallgren of Everett to the U.S. Senate. (He became a one-term governor four years later.)





to Congress. Pelly is depicted pointing to "IKE."

It's always open season on governors, in Washington State at least. There's a "Retire Rosellini Club" pin, circa 1960s, and even an "Impeach Langlie" button from the 1950s, but Governor Booth Gardner and his star-crossed predecessor, John Spellman, may be the only two Washington governors to have their images mockingly depicted on political buttons. After Spellman characterized the no-new-taxes Republicans in his party as "Troglodytes" in 1982 it became their badge of honor. They



distributed three Troglodyte pins, one featuring the comic strip caveman, Alley Oop, crowning Spellman with the Capitol Dome. When Gardner faced his own budget crunch four years later, he angered teachers and other state employee unions by offering only a 3 percent raise. They retaliated with a "Booth Buster" pin.



The most unusual coat-tail button in the annals of Washington State politics was issued in 1972. Former two-term governor Albert Rosellini was attempting a comeback against Dan Evans, the progressive Republican he had lost to eight years earlier. Leading in the polls and anxious to distance himself from George McGovern, who was wobbling at the top of the Democratic ticket, Rosellini authorized a pin featuring his signature rose below Nixon's name. Rosellini proceeded to self-destruct when he mockingly referred to Evans as "Danny boy" during a debate. Evans handily won a third term, while Nixon swept the state. The Nixon-Rosellini rose pin has auctioned for \$50 to \$100.




To represent "The Other Washington/Reagan Country," a 3½-inch pin from 1980 features evergreens, snow-capped mountains and a shock of wheat. In 1988, Washington State Bush delegates to the GOP National Conven-

tion wore buttons with "Washington For Bush" on a red delicious apple. A scarce Reagan pin commissioned by the Snohomish County Republican Women's Club, presumably in 1984, declares "We're Still Erupting For Reagan," with Mount Saint Helens blowing its top. It commands \$50 to \$100.

A scarce beauty with a great slogan is a 1920 portrait pin for a presidential hopeful

from Spokane, U.S. Senator Miles Poindexter. A crusader against the "Red Menace"—Bolsheviks, Wobblies and perceived fellow travelers—Poindexter brought up the rear in two GOP primaries but had one of the best buttons of the election year: "No Red Without The White And Blue; Miles Poindexter For President; Government By Law." It sells for around \$150.



As for the Holy Grail, a handsome young FDR, not yet crippled by polio, whistle-stopped Grays Harbor in 1920. The train station is still there, just five blocks from my house. I keep thinking there's a Cox-Roosevelt jugate here somewhere at a flea market or garage sale, just waiting for me to claim it for \$5.



Actual size 3-1/2"







ROOSEVELT





Actual size 3-1/2"

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Rare George McClellan 1864 Ferrotype Badge, Sold for \$2,250



Breckenridge and Lane 1860 National Democratic Banner. Sold for \$11,000



Douglas and Johnson 1860 Pictorial Campaign Flag. Sold for \$15,000



Wm.J. Bryan and J.W. Briedenthal Rare "Tornado" Button. Sold for \$800



Theo. Roosevelt and J.B. Corliss 1904 Exposition Jugate Button. Sold for \$4,000



Franklin D. Roosevelt 1912 NY State Senate Hopeful Button. Sold for \$3,750



Rare Kennedy and Johnson "All Star Team" Celluloid Button. Sold for \$1,700

More historic collections to be offered in coming months include: Important Medals (December 16th) and Americana (February 17th). Upcoming estates auctions November 5th and December 3rd.




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
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