



THE KEYNOTER




**APIC INTERVIEW:
SENATOR GEORGE MCGOVERN**

President's Message

With this issue we close another volume/year of *The Keynoter*. Under Roger Fischer's guidance, and the hard work of many contributors, the quarterly historical journal of the American Political Items Collectors continues to increase in stature and significance as the basic resource of scholarship and record for this hobby. Through *The Keynoter*, our members have read provocative interviews and pioneering articles on a broad range of topics in the fields of American political and historical artifacts, been shown newly discovered items of historical and collecting importance and pieces from the Smithsonian collection not available for public display, and participated in an expanding series of continuing APIC special projects. While the history is found in the writings, the "of record" function of *The Keynoter* is in its excellent illustrations, as ours is a graphic hobby. Good examples of how we meet our perceived objective of staying current with political history while updating our knowledge of the past can be seen in the article on the nuclear freeze movement and the picturing of a newly-found 1¼" Davis-Bryan jugate, the first known "message" jugate for the 1924 Democratic campaign, both in this issue.

The Spring 1983 *Keynoter* will be another first: An APIC major project double-issue. So far, over 1200 photographs have been taken, containing pictures of more than 5,000 items of all types. Arrangements have been made to publish a significant private letter concerning the 1944 Vice Presidential nomination, and interview with FDR's private secretary from 1929—1945, and an outstanding study of the artifact history of the Roosevelt era. Coming soon — to your mailbox!

Make plans now for the 1983 APIC National Convention at the Sheraton O'Hare, Chicago, Illinois, August 10-13, 1983.




Robert A. Fratkin

Editor's Message

As we look back on 1982, it has been a rather calm year in the hobby of political collecting—no civil wars between rival organizations, no raging furors over the legitimacy of new items, no Cox-Roosevelt jugates going under the gavel for more than a split-level in the suburbs used to bring. In 1982 we welcomed many newcomers into our ranks and said farewell to a few irreplaceable pioneers like Leon Weisel. With APIC's new status as a tax-exempt organization, we look forward to doing some things in 1983 that were impossible before, including a truly spectacular double-issue *Keynoter* on the FDR collection of Joe Jacobs, a massive project nearly two years in the making. 1982 has been a good year for me, enriched by a belated discovery of the magic of contemporary cause material.

My list of thank-yous for 1982 *Keynoters* is a long one. No editor could ask for a better production team than Bob Fratkin, Ronnie Lapinsky, and Joe and Vi Hayes. If Bill Arps ever presented us with a bill reflecting the extraordinary quality and quantity of the photographic work he has done for us, dues would triple! A partial list of those who have contributed articles, photographs, items, and ideas for which we owe a debt of gratitude include: Dr. Morton Rose, Preston Malcom, Edith Mayo, Elizabeth Wharton, Joe Wasserman, John Vargo, Bob Rouse, Michael Kelly, Michael Meiring, Chuck Gauthier, David Kranz, Bob Hultkrantz, the Smithsonian Institution, Ted Hake, Joyce Hamula, Clay Colt, Larry Fox, Neil Machander, and David Frent. The length of the list is testimony to the broadly-based support *The Keynoter* has received from our ranks. To Senator George S. McGovern we owe a special measure of thanks, for his time and effort and for a measure of candor that would constitute a "scoop" in *Time* or *Newsweek*!



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APIC seeks to encourage and support the study and preservation of original materials issuing from and relating to political campaigns of the United States of America and to bring its members fuller appreciation and deeper understanding of the candidates and issues that form our political heritage.

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Illustration: The Editor would like to thank Joseph Wasserman, David Kranz, Robert Fratkin, Greg Lines, Norman Loewenstern, Ronnie Lapinsky, the Smithsonian Institution, Larry Fox, Clay Colt and Mary Zepernick for providing the items pictured in this issue.

Covers: **Front:** 6" red, white, blue and black button; **Back:** Red, white and blue T-shirt design, four 6" buttons (clockwise) red, white, blue and black, brown and white, red and white, and blue and white.



In The Next Issue

The Spring Keynoter will be a double issue featuring the campaigns of Franklin D. Roosevelt, illustrated with many previously unpictured items from the collection of Joseph M. Jacobs.

APIC INTERVIEW:

SENATOR GEORGE MCGOVERN

Interviewed By Joseph Wasserman, With John Vargo

Born in 1922 in Avon, South Dakota, George McGovern served with distinction as a bomber pilot during World War II, received postgraduate training in history at Northwestern University, and came home to South Dakota to begin a career in college teaching. His baptism in politics came in 1948, when he was a delegate to Henry Wallace's Progressive party convention, but he became alienated by the ideological rigidity of "Gideon's Army" and did not even vote in November. He played a major role in reviving South Dakota's moribund Democratic party and in 1956 he defied the Eisenhower tidal wave to win election to the Congress. He was returned in 1958, lost a Senate bid in 1960, and then in 1962 became South Dakota's first Democratic senator in more than a quarter century. Rapidly establishing himself as a major figure in his party's progressive wing, McGovern endorsed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1965 but gradually broke with the Johnson administration over Vietnam and in 1968 supported the presidential bid of Robert F. Kennedy. He served as a stand-in for Kennedy delegates, won re-election to his Senate seat, and a year later agreed to serve as co-chair of the commission that thoroughly overhauled the electoral apparatus of the Democratic party. Few took seriously his announcement in January, 1971, that he would seek the 1972 presidential nomination,

but his early start, knowledge of the new guidelines, hard work — and the fervent support and organizational skills of the young, campus-oriented constituency he forged — brought him a string of upset victories in the primaries and a narrow first-ballot nomination in Miami Beach. After his overwhelming defeat at the hands of Richard Nixon that November, McGovern returned to the Senate, a beloved icon to much of the American left but increasingly out of step with a South Dakota electorate moving inexorably to the right. He rather easily survived a spirited Republican challenge to win re-election in 1974, but lost his seat in 1980 to James Abner, Ronald Reagan's coattails, and the targeted negative campaigns of Richard Viguerie, NCPAC and other New Right lobbies.

As this remarkably candid interview demonstrates, McGovern at sixty remains as unwilling to see his political commitment in the past tense as he is unwilling to consign his progressive agenda to the limbo of history's lost causes. The interview was arranged by Joe Wasserman, who conducted it with the able assistance of John Vargo. It is certainly a vintage McGovern performance, with candor triumphing over tact, commitment over consensus. The Keynoter is deeply indebted to Senator McGovern.



Senator McGovern with Joe Wasserman (Left) and John Vargo (Right)



Wasserman: "Senator McGovern, in 1972 you were defeated by Richard Nixon in one of the largest electoral and popular vote landslides in American history. Looking back on 1972, what — if anything — would you have done differently?"

McGovern: "There were two factors that turned that election into a landslide; first of all the inability of George Wallace to run as an independent after he was shot, and secondly the Eagleton affair. It probably would have been a Nixon victory against any Democrat running in 1972, no matter what we had done, because he was riding high. He had just come off the China trip, detente with the Soviet Union, the signing of the SALT I Treaty, the establishment of wage and price controls. They were pumping money into the national economy as fast as they could shovel it in, so that everything was breaking for him. Beyond all of this they announced a week before the election that peace was at hand at long last in Vietnam, which had been the central issue in my campaign. To have that issue — apparently, but not actually — resolved a week before the election really was the coup d'grace. So those factors were important, but to go back to the beginning, in 1968 George Wallace got — I have to check the exact figure, but I think it was ten million votes. Maybe you could check to get the exact amount."

Wasserman: "That is right, he did."


McGovern: "That vote came right off the top of Richard Nixon's votes. There is no question that Wallace and Nixon were closer ideologically than Humphrey and Wallace. So I always felt that the major part of the Wallace vote of 1968 was votes that were taken away from Richard Nixon and that made it a fairly close election. In 1972 Wallace was the toughest competition I had in some of the Democratic primaries. He was tougher by far than he was in '68. Take the Wisconsin primary — you think of Wisconsin as a progressive state — George Wallace came in second to me ahead of Humphrey and Muskie. He won the Michigan

primary hands down. He had more votes than all the rest of the Democratic candidates combined, including Humphrey and me combined."

Wasserman: "He almost carried Maryland."

McGovern: "He almost carried Maryland. Wallace was a hot article in 1972 inside the Democratic party. He was piling up votes faster than any other candidate with the exception of myself. That being the case, when he was shot the day before the Maryland and Michigan primaries and taken out of the race, Nixon's southern strategy which had been unfolding for four years came into play in a diabolically clever way, in that he had been orchestrating the Wallace vote for four years with bad Supreme Court appointments, openly defying the courts on the busing decision, the tough hard line against young people, the anti-war stance, Agnew's forays into the South, and orchestrating the prejudices of the so-called "silent majority." All of this was calculated to appeal to that Wallace vote. The minute it became clear that Wallace was not an alternative after he was shot, that old Wallace crowd migrated to the Nixon camp. Obviously they couldn't support an anti-war northern liberal like George McGovern, who was surrounded by young anti-war activists, by angry blacks and outraged minority groups. So the formula for the election was the Nixon vote plus the Wallace vote combined behind Nixon in one party. That is the statistical difference primarily between '72 and '68. I got approximately the same vote that Hubert Humphrey did. The difference is that Nixon added the Wallace vote on top of what he had the year he ran against Humphrey. Now the second thing that killed us in '72 if, in fact, we ever had a chance to win the election was the Eagleton affair, because it blew us right out of the water. It was so ballyhooed in the press."

Wasserman: "I'd like to direct a question to that. Your chances for victory in '72 were unquestionably dealt a blow



by the Eagleton affair, making you appear to many Americans to be both cruel and indecisive. In retrospect, do you now wish that you had retained Eagleton, and faced the issue on treatment for mental illness as courageously as you had addressed Vietnam?"

McGovern: "Yes, politically that would have been the thing to do; it would not have been the courageous thing to do, because it would have been putting my political ambitions ahead of the good of the country. It would have been politically sound to stay with my original decision to go with Eagleton even after it came out that he had a long history of mental illness. It would not have been fair to the country or to the credibility of our position to go with a candidate with a long history of serious mental illness who had also covered it up. Tom Eagleton had been mentally ill for many years. Instead of coming clean with it himself and facing the voters in Missouri, all these cover stories were issued. When he went in for treatment, when he was in getting treatment at the Mayo Clinic — electric shock therapy — a cover story was put out by his office that he was being treated in another place for a stomach ailment. So we had the problem of a cover-up inside our own ranks that we hadn't known about at the time we picked him. Plus the fact that leading psychiatrists in the country told me that it was too big a risk to the nation to put one heartbeat away from the White House a man that had a history of mental instability. Tom Eagleton had been suffering as a manic depressive for many years and I felt that it was . . . the more I learned about the disease, the more I felt that my initial judgment to stay with him was wrong. I went through a very tortured week, a soul-searching one, and finally made the decision that I thought was in the best interest of the country, although not in the best interest of me or the short-term political benefit. I would be curious, ten years later, what is your feeling on what we should have done? Should we have kept him or bounced him earlier?"

Wasserman: "It is so easy to Monday-morning quarterback. It certainly didn't help your image, but, again obviously there are a lot of things that we didn't know and . . ."

McGovern: "The problem with the damned thing is that I couldn't get all the information in one session. Tom just kept kind of leaking it out a piece at a time. And what looked like a reasonable decision to stick with him all the way on Monday looked like a disaster by Friday. And so people say, 'Gee, McGovern is all for him at the beginning of the week and a week later he asked him to step down. Gee, can you depend on this guy for anything?' Well, I honestly believe that no nationally known figure had a better record of consistency than I had. And yet that one little incident blew the whole thing. And as Nixon people started running those television commercials showing the flipping head, it was all based on that Eagleton thing. I've got to tell you that to this

day I still don't know how to deal with a guy with a long history of mental illness — whether it is safe to put him in the White House or whether it isn't."

Vargo: "I think what you said earlier about the seriousness of the problem is determinative, but at the time I think that the main statements were to the effect that his problem wasn't very serious, that it in essence had been cured."

McGovern: "You never get cured being a manic depressive any more than you get cured of being an alcoholic. I mean it is something you learn to control and in the last ten years lithium has come in, that just transforms the whole thing. They don't use electric shock therapy much anymore. But poor Tom all during the '50s and '60s was getting those electric shock bumps. I didn't know — how do I know about what that does to your brain or your mental stability? I got all these frightful calls from psychiatrists saying, 'You can't do this to the country.' And then our whole finance committee said they would resign if I kept him on the ticket. So I was under enormous pressure, but I think politically once I said I was going to keep him, I just should have said, 'That's it,' and take that chance."

Wasserman: "With the fight you had in the primary with you and Humphrey in California and getting enough delegates to secure the nomination, how much time did you spend selecting a vice-presidential candidate and how long before the convention did you decide that it was going to be Tom Eagleton?"

McGovern: "Well, this leads me to the third blow that we received in 1972 that helped bring about our defeat and that was the almost savage nature of the in-fighting and the public slashing that went on right up until the time of nomination. I agreed to three televised debates with Senator Humphrey after I had virtually won the nomination. That was a very serious mistake. I had been trying to get him to debate for a year and he had refused to do so until he was almost out of the race and then in desperation, after his money was gone and he couldn't get on television any other way, he agreed to debate me in California. I went into those debates with the frame of mind of trying not to alienate the Humphrey people whom I thought I would need in the fall. Hubert — who was my old friend, and I still have great affection for him—went in in a kind of desperation mood to knock me out of the box and the really slashing attacks made in those three debates hurt us very seriously with millions of people across the country. Also, it meant when the Humphrey people and all the other candidates that I had defeated, when they joined in an anybody-but-McGovern last-minute move to deprive us of the California delegation at the national convention, we had to use that month when we should have been getting ready for the convention — writing the acceptance address, picking a running mate, working on the platform — we had to use that time to try to

save the nomination we already thought we had won. And the truth is, in answer to your question specifically, we turned to Eagleton just a few minutes before the deadline because of the fact that the polls showed Nixon was running ahead and it was unlikely that I could win. I had great difficulty getting a running mate. Six or seven people turned me down and each one of them would ask a little time to think it over."

Wasserman: "Who was your first choice?"

McGovern: "The first choice was Governor Askew of Florida and he turned me down two days before I won the nomination. He sent word that he didn't want to embarrass me by turning it down but that he had just been elected governor of Florida and he didn't think he should give it up eighteen months after becoming the governor of Florida."

Wasserman: "Was Senator Kennedy on your list?"

McGovern: "He was number two, Vice President Mondale was number three, Gaylord Nelson was number four, Sargent Shriver was number five, but he was in the Soviet Union and we couldn't find him. He was on a legal case. I have forgotten the rest of the pecking order, but we got up to about seven candidates. The one merit that Eagleton had — he had been a Muskie backer during the primaries, supported Muskie all the way through — was that he wanted it. He was one of the few people actively campaigning for it and he seemed to be a kind of good compromise candidate. But I suppose I spent as much time as anybody up until 1976 looking for a vice-presidential running mate. It is always a snap judgment that is made at the last minute. I think during the first two hundred years of our history, up until the costly problem with Eagleton, no presidential candidate spent much time thinking about his running mate. Just to give you an example for your own interest, Stevenson — when he was selected in '52 — they were sitting around having drinks about 1:00 in the morning and somebody said, 'My God, Governor, we've got to have a running mate.' He asked, 'Who do you think it ought to be?,' and somebody replied, 'Well, probably a southerner, since you are from the North, and since you're a governor maybe we ought to get a senator.' Somebody else said, 'How about

John Sparkman?' He said, 'Fine with me.' So he picked up the phone. They didn't run a check. They didn't have the FBI checking. They didn't ask 'Is he honest? Is he mentally ill? Does he pay his bills?' They just called him up and asked him if he would take it and he said, 'Sure.' That was it. That is the way it is usually done."

Wasserman: "I'd like to get back to Hubert Humphrey for a minute. Is it true that one casualty of the 1972 campaign was your long-time friendship with Hubert Humphrey?"

McGovern: "No. Hubert Humphrey remained my friend until he breathed his last breath. We were next door neighbors in Chevy Chase, Maryland, for ten years. I rode to work with him every week, two or three days a week. He had been to South Dakota more times than I could count, speaking for me over the years. He helped raise money for all of my campaigns. I would have to say this, that after 1965 our relationship became strained because of the Vietnam War. He was a strong supporter of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. I was bitterly opposed to it. So we finally got to the point where we decided not to talk about that issue — each one agreed that we were not going to influence the other, and we ruled it off-limits. I would say that there was some strain in the relationship after those debates in California. It was a pretty tough job that was done and Hubert came to regret it. He expressed an apology to me after the election was over. He came out in '74 to help me campaign for re-election to the Senate, and that was a kind of peace offering."

Wasserman: "What are your thoughts on Humphrey and his contribution to our political process?"

McGovern: "Hubert Humphrey's great contribution was in the field of civil rights, in my judgment. He was one northern senator who from the very beginning spoke out vigorously and effectively on the civil rights issue. That speech he made in the 1948 national convention was, in my judgment, the highlight of his career. Humphrey was terrific on such things as Food for Peace, agriculture, labor issues, social security — the issues that affected the ordinary American. Hubert Humphrey was very strong in those areas."

Wasserman: "In eighteen years in the Senate you served with many colleagues. Which ones stand out in your mind as

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SEPTEMBER 20 1972

\$ BUCK

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Gay W. Miller

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COUNTY DELEGATES

McGOVERN FOR PRESIDENT

PRIMARY ELECTION

JUNE 6, 1972

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the truly outstanding senators of the '60s and '70s?"

McGovern: Bill Fulbright, certainly. His marvelous hearings on the fundamental issues of American foreign policy, leadership on the Fulbright exchange program, the Fulbright hearings during the Vietnam period. I would say Hubert Humphrey, for the reasons I just mentioned, deserves to be on the list of the 'big ten' in the Senate. Wayne Morse, who was one of the most innovative, courageous, brilliant men in the Senate. I put him high on the list. On the Republican side, I think that John Sherman Cooper was one of the most effective Republicans. George Aiken was one of those steady, dependable men of great integrity that I have always admired on the Republican side. Jack Javits — I think that of all the people I have known in the United States Senate, Jack Javits may have been the most brilliant and possibly the most articulate speaker of the '60s and '70s. I would say that from that standpoint he and Humphrey were about on the same level in oratorical powers and quickness in mind and the capacity to articulate complicated ideas in the language of the street."

Wasserman: "In the same span, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter occupied the presidency of the United States. How would you characterize these men in terms of intelligence,



stay with them in a consistent, effective, follow-through way. His administration seemed to move in stops and starts and occasionally changing positions in a short period of time, in such a way as to give the impression of a lack of effectiveness. I suppose that is the central criticism I'd make of his administration, just an inability to articulate the great issues. I also think that Carter was too conservative for the times. I don't think he was defeated because he was too liberal. I think he was defeated because he was too much like the Republicans in his kind of antigovernment approach at a time when strong government solutions were needed."

Wasserman: "Watergate aside, Richard Nixon?"

McGovern: "Richard Nixon was the best of the bunch in handling the Soviet Union and China, the two other superpowers. He deserves fairly high marks in history for orchestrating detente better than any other president with the Soviet Union, including the signing of the SALT I Treaty. Secondly, his going to China was one of the great breakthroughs in American politics and American diplomacy. And it is said that one of the reasons he was able to do that was that he didn't have Richard Nixon to worry about as a critic! If a Democrat, at an earlier time, had attempted that, Nixon would have led the onslaught against the Democrat for selling us out to Red China! But his political credentials were so strong with the conservative element in the country that he could do this politically and get away with it. But the fact is, he did it. He had the wit and the intelligence to go ahead and do something that should have been done thirty years earlier, and you have to give him credit for that. So I would say in the handling of the other two superpowers, Russia and China, Nixon has done better than any other president since FDR. I also think that Nixon did some kind of interesting things on the home front, the great experiment with the family assistance program. He backed away from it, but that was kind of a precursor of the McGovern thousand dollar guaranteed income plan. Both of these were innovative, worthwhile plans that should have

leadership, effectiveness, and working with Congress, and the general legacy that they left? How would you rate them?"

McGovern: "Kennedy was the most graceful figure that I can recall in the White House in recent years. He was not particularly effective with the Congress, but maybe it was because he was trying to do things that were ahead of his time in terms of where the Congress was at. He was out in front on a number of issues that Congress just wasn't ready to go along on. I think the most important thing he did was to try to get through the limited nuclear test ban treaty. Johnson was far and away the best with dealing with the Congress. He knew how to twist arms and talk one-on-one and to really take you to the woodshed on issues. He got through by far the most legislation of the presidents you have mentioned. Jerry Ford was probably a pretty good interim president after Watergate. The country, after all, had elected Nixon in a landslide, so they were entitled, I think, to a conservative Republican president notwithstanding Nixon's resignation. Ford had supported the Nixon positions almost one hundred percent, and yet I think he did it with a certain amount of reassurance and decency and old-fashioned virtues. So I felt that Ford did his job pretty well during the period he was in. Carter was, well all agree, a highly intelligent president. He was a very well-meaning man. I think that he had considerable personal integrity. But I think Carter lacked the capacity to define the major issues that were before the country and to





been accepted rather than ridiculed."


Wasserman: "I'd like to get back to Watergate and get some thoughts of yours about that. We now know that part of the 'dirty-tricks' effort by the Nixon re-election forces involved weakening or embarrassing the campaigns of some of your rivals for the Democratic nomination, because some of the Nixonites believed that you would be the easiest candidate for Nixon to defeat. Do you believe that these dirty tricks played much of a role in your nomination or have they been blown way out of proportion by the whole uproar over Watergate?"

McGovern: "I think they had very little impact on the nomination. It was this kid Segretti that you are talking about and the stuff he did was child's play. I don't think it had much impact on anybody's campaign. But one thing that is always cited is the letter they circulated about Muskie that is said to have led to the crying incident in New Hampshire. I don't think that that cost Ed any votes. I was in New Hampshire at the time and we were polling daily and we had Pat Cadell working for us then. He was running a daily poll in New Hampshire. We were polling enough people every day to follow that sentiment and what our poll showed is that he picked up four points in New Hampshire after the crying incident. Most people thought it was a deeply human reaction, but the press — who had forecast Muskie as the winner — had such great difficulty recognizing that they were wrong and he was beaten by a junior senator from South Dakota who came out of nowhere.

They had to have some dramatic reason to explain why Muskie had lost the nomination and I had won. I don't think that Segretti had much to do with it at all."



Wasserman: "I agree with you, because I worked in your campaign in that early part and I know how hard you worked making telephone calls, especially in that primary state, while Muskie was trying to win by endorsement."

McGovern: "Exactly. One of the reasons I've always thought that Ed broke down and cried in New Hampshire is that he arrived in New Hampshire in the closing days of the primary to discover that he was slipping very fast, and I think he saw the nomination slipping away. I've never criticized him for that; I thought it was a deeply human kind of marvelous reaction that somebody would be that upset about an attack on his wife. He had tried to spread himself over fifty states and we were concentrating hard on the primary states of New Hampshire, Wisconsin, California, and Massachusetts, the big primary tests, and we had a better organization. We were better positioned on the issues. We had an open-disclosure policy on finances that was very popular. We had the enthusiasm of more volunteers, and while Ed and others were going after party endorsements, we were going after the voters, after rank-and-file people. We had far and away the best army of volunteers, I think, ever assembled in American politics and we won that nomination fair and square. My best judgment is that for every vote Segretti and his operation changed against a candidate, they probably picked up one for him. I think they



"Those who have had a chance for four years and could not produce peace, should not be given another chance."

Richard Nixon
October 9th, 1968



be as attracted to Nixon as they were? He had a much more anti-labor voting record than I, even if you could say that I made a mistake in that vote — and I think probably I did. That was one vote out of hundreds, thousands of votes I had cast that organized labor thought were perfectly proper. By the way, Walter Reuther — the late Walter Reuther — told me that I voted exactly right on that. He said, 'Coming from South Dakota if you get too far away from prevailing opinion in that state you are not going to be around here to vote for anything else labor is interested in,' and he and his associates told me I voted exactly right on the 14-B matter." **Vargo:** "One other matter; in the '72 campaign were finances a problem at all?"

McGovern: "No, no. We raised and spent \$32,000,000. The Nixon people raised and spent \$65,000,000. They doubled up on us, but we had adequate funding. I think they wasted a lot of their money and they spent an awful lot of it on the Watergate cover-up. In retrospect, the Nixon campaign in 1972 after the Watergate break-in was largely a secret campaign. Keep in mind, the President rarely left the White House after that; he just stayed there in the Rose Garden issuing pronouncements and the whole apparatus of that Republican White House structure was invested in covering up the Watergate scenario. They spent a lot of money on that that we didn't know about."







"For McGovern Before New Hampshire (Miami)"

Wasserman: "Even though you were defeated in 1972 and eight years later lost your seat in the Senate, it is clear that you have been one of the relatively few public figures to make a permanent mark on American history in politics. What do you see as the positive legacies of your 1972 effort? How would you like to be remembered by historians?"

McGovern: "I would like to be remembered as the presidential candidate who rallied the entire anti-war sentiment in the country and focused it in one campaign. I don't say that I was the moving spirit of the anti-war movement, but I gave it a focus. Had there not been a strong, clear, passionate anti-war candidate running at the head of one of the major parties in 1972, that war might still be on! We might have gone into World War III, but it provided a focal point that literally forced the administration to terminate that war. They were desperate to be able to have that press conference on October 25th, one week before the election, and announce that peace was at hand. That's what it was all about; the time-table for ending the Vietnam War was the election in 1972. And I would like to be remembered as the man who led the '72 effort that I believe put the domestic political pressure on the administration to end the war. Secondly, we opened up the political process, and I want to be remembered for that. We brought in the women, the young people, the minorities, the poor, and people who had never been involved in a presidential selection process came in '72 and I think they are there to stay."

Wasserman: "I would like you to look at some of these items from your campaign. I understand that you are an avid collector of material. Maybe you can remember a few of these and tell me some things."





McGovern: "There is no other campaign in American history that produced so many buttons."

Vargo: "Were you aware that your campaign organization was producing such a massive number of buttons?"

McGovern: "I knew there were a lot of them, because everywhere I'd go I'd see a new one. I regret I didn't pluck them off people's coats at the time, because I suspect nobody has a complete collection. What would happen, you know, I would go into a rally in Pittsburgh and they had a button on — 'Pittsburgh Rally for McGovern Committee' — and a lot of those were lost right after the rally. There were just literally thousands of buttons put together. I don't know how many I have, but I guess I've most of the ones you have here and maybe some you don't have. Do you know what October 9th was?"

Wasserman: "It was Nixon's statement, famous statement."

McGovern: "It was when Nixon said, 'Those who have had four years to end the war in Vietnam and have not done so do not deserve another chance.' That's what he said about Humphrey on October 9, 1968. Somebody printed those."

Vargo: "To what extent were you involved in the preparation of items? Did you sign off on designs for materials at all or was that mainly handled by the staff?"

McGovern: "It was not a consistent thing. Sometimes I did, and sometimes they turned it out so fast that I didn't."

Wasserman: "Did you have anything to do with the rainbow design and a number of issue pins that were really unusual?"

McGovern: "I approved it."


Wasserman: "As one of its principal victims, how would you assess the Reagan movement in contemporary American politics?"

McGovern: "It's a flash-in-the-pan in my judgment. I think they exploited the unpopularity of President Carter to the point where a hardline ideological minority within a minority party was able to take over the United States government. In my judgment, that's not permanent."

Wasserman: "You don't think there's been a fundamental shift away from the activism begun by FDR?"

McGovern: "No, not at all. I think most people accept the major gains and principles of the New Deal. When Ronald Reagan said that our problems are not going to be solved by the government — the government is the problem — he put himself squarely at odds against most of the American people. And the reason the Democratic party has been the majority party in the United States for two hundred years is because it doesn't believe that kind of nonsense. The Democratic party believes that government is one of the answers to our problems because it is the instrument by





All buttons in this article shown 60% actual size

which the people in a free society govern themselves. It is the instrument by which we're going to have to deal with such problems as environmental pollution. Is the free market going to save us from destruction of the air and water in this country? The government is the instrument that we are going to have to use to stabilize our economy and put people back to work. You tell one of these eleven million people out on the unemployment lines that government's the problem. They are going to laugh you out of court! They know that any chance that we have in this country to put those eleven million people back to work depends on intelligent, positive, strong government action. Tell a seventy-year-old woman whose Social Security is in jeopardy that government can't solve the problem and you'll never get her vote. She knows that Social Security is a creation of the United States government supported by the American people and it's only going to be sustained by a government that cares about the old. Is the free market going to solve the danger of nuclear war that could wipe everybody off this planet? That is going to be taken care of by having a government of men and women of common sense and intelligence working through the process of politics and diplomacy to end the arms race. So every basic problem facing the world today requires a strong, compassionate, intelligent government if those problems are going to get solved. There is no way that a Ronald Reagan preaching the gospel of ending the role of government in our society is going to survive politically."

Wasserman: "What role do you see yourself playing in the resurgence of liberalism of the sort you are talking about?"

McGovern: "Well, I have been saying ever since 1980 that although I went down in defeat in 1980, I do not believe that there was a fundamental shift in the American political mainstream in this country. I still think that the most effective force for the resolution of our problems is an intelligent liberalism and I want to keep asserting that on every platform across the country. I think there are two fundamental issues before the country right now that are related. One is the fact that our economy is stagnant and in deep trouble, as witness the fact we have probably eleven million people looking for jobs and yet there is so much that needs to be done. Our railroads are falling apart, our city streets are breaking up, our urban water and sewage systems are falling apart. The whole infrastructure of cities and towns, highways and water systems are falling apart. Top soil is blowing away. So it is ridiculous to have ten or eleven million people unemployed when you have these kinds of public needs that could be met, I believe, through a combination of government and private action, a partnership of some kind between industry and labor and government. The other big problem closely related to that is the enormously expensive and dangerous arms race that is going on. That is what is taking the substance of the country that we need to invest in the kind of rebuilding here at home that would put people back to work. So ending the arms race and creating an abundant full-employment economy addressing the most urgent public needs of our society are the two big challenges that I want to address."

Wasserman: "How do you plan on addressing them? Do you have any future plans for public office?"







McGovern: "Well, I am not going to run for the Senate again. If I ever run for office again, it will be for the presidency. After working up on the seniority scale for eighteen years in the United States Senate — next in line for the chairmanship of the Agriculture Committee, the number three person on the Foreign Relations Committee, ranking person on the Joint Economic Committee — I'm not going to go back to the Senate and start at the bottom, where I was in 1962."

Wasserman: "Senator Goldwater did that."

McGovern: "Senator Goldwater did that, and I applaud that, but I have no desire to do that. If I run for anything I'd run for the presidency. This isn't an announcement, but it is an indication that I haven't entirely closed the door either. I want to see how things look after the 1982 elections are out of the way."

Wasserman: "Even Senator Humphrey did that."

McGovern: "That is correct. Humphrey did it. But I come from a very conservative state. I'm a progressive liberal Democrat and it would be considerably easier for Senator Humphrey to be re-elected in Minnesota than it would for the same kind of philosophy to prevail in South Dakota. Senator Goldwater went back to Arizona, where he was politically and spiritually at home. Much easier for him to do than it would be for me to go back to South Dakota. I have always thought my elections in South Dakota were political miracles and I think probably I've run out of miracles in South Dakota. I think they really prefer someone who's more conservative and a little less visible nationally, perhaps, than I was. So I don't see any point in bucking those deep-seated conservative trends in the state. Frankly, it would be just as easy for me to run for national office as it would be to go back to South Dakota and seek re-election to the Senate. I should take advantage of having a couple of live people here in the audience and ask if you can see any



condition under which it makes any sense for me to think about another presidential run. I say somewhat facetiously that one of the reasons I should run is that I don't have a job. I need a job, but in a larger sense, it is so important that I could devote full time, obviously I don't need the job. But I could devote full time to it. And some days I have the feeling, what would be more exciting and rewarding than spending the next two years campaigning for the Democratic nomination? What could be the best forum any figure could have, whether you won or lost? You would talk to literally millions of people and would have access to talk shows and the networks. And then I get to thinking, you know, almost every issue is covered by somebody. Cranston is very good on nuclear issues, Kennedy good on welfare and domestic questions, Mondale good on foreign policy and generally."

Wasserman: "Don't you think the issues get fragmented and they start focusing on personalities? Well, these people are considered serious candidates."

McGovern: "Yes. Well, somehow, one side of me says I ought to do it. Another side of me just says I'd look like a goddamn fool if I get into it again. But I just have a kind of ambivalent

view of it that I've got to resolve one way or the other in the next few months or so. I would be interested in what you fellows thought."

Wasserman: "Have you ruled out entirely a race against Larry Pressler in 1984?"

McGovern: "Yes, I really have. You should have seen what went on out there in 1980. You couldn't believe it, real friends of mine years gone back that turned against me on this abortion question. People would come up to me that I have known for twenty years and say, 'Now you voted to give our Panama Canal to those communists and I'll never vote for you again!' It was a really ugly situation. I am not sure I could be reelected in that state."





Vargo: It is a shame what the level of public debate has sunk to on some of these questions, and that in itself, I think, is good argument in favor of your making an effort."

McGovern: "Nationally, that is."

Vargo: "Yes, just for the contribution you have been making."

McGovern: "Thank you."

Wasserman, Vargo: "Thank you, Senator McGovern." *



McGovern Coattails

by Robert Rouse

Most of the McGovern coattail items identified here are from three liberal centers: Oregon, Metropolitan Chicago, and New York City. Items from Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania are also pictured along with several buttons issued by candidates for convention delegate, a position which was opened to popular competition by the reform of the party rules which followed the violent 1968 convention in Chicago. McGovern and Jimmy Carter were among the first to understand the implications of these changes and both of these relatively obscure candidates parlayed their knowledge into Democratic presidential nominations.

Three Oregon items identify McGovern with former Senator Wayne Morse, another outspoken critic of the Vietnam War. Morse entered the Senate in 1944 and won a second term as a Republican. In 1956 and 1962 he was returned to the Senate as a Democrat. In 1968 he lost a very close race to Republican Robert Packwood, and in 1972, his comeback hopes were dashed by Senator Mark Hatfield. (For a more complete synopsis of Morse's political career see "Odd Man Out" in *The Keynoter*, Summer, 1981.) In Oregon's fourth district, challenger Charles Porter lost to three term incumbent John Dellenback of Medford by a margin of nearly two to one, for the second time. The Bonner/McGovern item is also from Oregon; Bonner was a candidate for State Representative from Eugene.

The Independent Voters of Illinois, IVI, is the Illinois chapter of Americans for Democratic Action, ADA. (ADA also issued a button for McGovern.) As such, IVI endorses selected liberal candidates regardless of their party affiliation. IVI is headquartered in Chicago and in 1972 they issued a set of eight similar green and white buttons for use in Chicago area districts. Six of the buttons carry McGovern's name. The other candidates are identified below. Dan Walker, former General Counsel for Montgomery Ward and Company, author of *Rights in Conflict*, better known as "the Walker Report" which was a study of the violence which erupted at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Walker concluded the turmoil was "a police riot." Walker also served as chairman of Adlai Stevenson's 1970 Senate campaign. Nevertheless, the ambitious Walker was unknown to Illinois voters when he decided to challenge Governor Richard Ogilvie, an excellent administrator who was vulnerable because he was identified with the imposition of the state income tax in 1969. To achieve name recognition Walker decided to make a grueling walk of more than 400 miles, the "length and breadth of Illinois" in the heat of summer, 1971. Talking to people along the way altered his views and led to a campaign focused on local issues as much as on statewide issues. This novel campaign tactic, the walk, was proven earlier by Senatorial candidates in Iowa, Florida, ("Walkin' with Lawton" Chiles) and elsewhere. Walker defeated Ogilvie by less than two percent of the vote.

Republican Senator Charles Percy defeated veteran Chicago Congressman Roman Puchinski for a second term in a landslide, Percy is now chairman of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee and he has begun to raise money for his 1984 campaign. Fellow Republican Bernard Carey was elected Cook County State's Attorney over Democrat Edward Hanrahan, who had enraged Chicago's large black community by leading a raid on Black Panther headquarters in which two black leaders were killed. After two good terms Carey lost his job in 1980 to Richard M. Daley, son of Chicago's late mayor, who is now running for his father's old job. Democrat Kenneth Clark lost the State's Attorney's race in Lake County, IL.

The remaining candidates were Democratic state legislative candidates. Robert Mann was a distinguished state representative from Chicago who earned the title, "Protector of Lake Michigan" for his tireless efforts to preserve Chicago's Lakefront as parkland rather than surrendering it piece by piece to the magnates of commerce and industry. Daniel Pierce was elected state representative in the 32nd district in Lake County, and Stephen Slavin lost the state Senate race there. Richard Newhouse was an articulate state senator who was the first black to run an unsuccessful campaign for mayor of Chicago when he lost the primary to Daley in 1975.

On the south side of Chicago, Kathryn Clement, Annette Guice, Don Levine, Andrew Hargrett and James Wagner were delegate candidates from the 1st CD committed to McGovern. They lost to the Chicago Democratic machine's uncommitted slate which owed its allegiance to Mayor Richard Daley. However, the McGovern delegates were seated in Miami when the Credentials Committee accepted them as part of a reform delegation from Illinois headed by anti-machine Alderman William Singer and civil rights leader Jesse Jackson in place of regular Democrats headed by Daley. The New Chicago Delegation distributed their own buttons as well as two anti-Daley buttons. When Daley returned to Chicago, an angry frustrated powerbroker who would have to watch the 1972 convention on television, his supporters distributed the Daley for President pins.

New York races produced at least seven different items. In the 14th CD, Brooklyn Congressman John Rooney, a 13 term incumbent backed by the Democratic and Conservative parties, easily defeated civil rights and anti-war activist Allard Lowenstein who ran on the Liberal ticket. Lowenstein had been elected to Congress from the 5th CD in 1968 with Democratic and Liberal backing but he lost a close race in 1970. In 1972 redistricting had divided his constituency so he moved to challenge the durable Rooney. Elsewhere in the city, veteran Democratic liberal William F. Ryan identified with McGovern in his hard fought primary campaign against carpetbagger Bella Abzug, a voluble one-term congresswoman whose district was also eliminated by Republican map makers in Albany. Ryan won the nomination but he died in September at the age of 49. As a sitting member of Congress, Abzug wielded more influence with local Democratic committeemen than Ryan's widow, Priscilla, who wanted the nomination herself. Mrs. Ryan accused Abzug of hastening her husband's death by forcing



VOTE DEMOCRAT
 PRESIDENT MCGOVERN
 VICE - PRESIDENT SHRIVER
 CONGRESS ROONEY
 ADULTER GENERAL CASEY
 STATE TREASURER SLOAN
 STATE REPRESENTATIVE PRENDERGAST

McGOVERN
Together
We Win
LUCEY

Can You Identify?

the vitriolic primary. Her outrage was magnified when Abzug received the nomination. Priscilla Ryan ran on the Liberal Party ticket but the bellicose Abzug out polled her two to one in what was easily the most bitter congressional race of 1972.

Daniel Greer identified with McGovern in his primary contest with Richard Gottfried. Gottfried won the primary and was elected to the New York State Assembly from the 67th District. Patrick Doherty ran for the state Assembly from a district in Nassau County. Delegate pins were issued by Robert Abrams, Bronx Borough President and Martha Overall of Greenwich Village.

Patrick Lucey was elected Governor of Wisconsin in 1970 and 1974. The button bearing his name is probably a convention pin used by the delegation he headed. The pin has a paper surface—there is no celluloid covering. Lucey returned to the national stage in 1980 when he joined Republican Congressman John Anderson as the VP candidate on the National Unity ticket.

Michigan's popular Attorney General Frank Kelley was favored to defeat Republican Senate whip Robert Griffin at the beginning of 1972. But that changed during the spring

when a Federal judge ordered a busing plan to exchange 300,000 white and black children between Detroit and its suburbs. This broke the effective coalition between blacks in Detroit and white auto workers in the suburbs which produced Democratic victories for JFK, LBJ, and HHH in Michigan. This divisive busing issue is immortalized on buttons of classic design from the George Wallace campaign. Kelley had been elected as an advocate of busing but once in office he obtained the court order which halted the Detroit program pending a ruling by the Federal Appeals Court. Though the court had not ruled by election day, voters no longer trusted Kelley and they returned "Michigan's Muscle" ("When he talks, President Nixon listens"), Robert Griffin, to the Senate with a plurality of 200,000 votes. This button may have been distributed at a joint appearance. McGovern visited Michigan seven or eight times and Kelley said he supported McGovern, but in his speeches he avoided mentioning the standard bearer whenever possible.

The final item is from eastern Pennsylvania. Congressman Fred Rooney of Bethlehem won his fifth term in 1972.★





GEORGE MCGOVERN
Your United States Senator

The House and Senate Buttons of George McGovern

by David Kranz

George McGovern is one of the few politicians who took a special interest in his own campaign buttons. Virtually every button made for McGovern's two congressional races and five Senate contests was scrutinized and sometimes designed by the candidate before they went to the manufacturer.

In 1956 McGovern, a Dakota Wesleyan professor, ran his first race in South Dakota, defeating incumbent Republican Harold O'Love of Watertown. In 1958 he fought off a challenge from Joe Foss, South Dakota's incumbent governor and a popular war hero, to retain his congressional seat.

In 1960 he decided to take on incumbent Republican Senator Karl Mundt of Madison. While the race was close, historians still believe that McGovern lost because of his ties to John Kennedy, who campaigned in South Dakota both for himself and for McGovern. After two years with the Kennedy Administration in the Food-for-Peace program, McGovern entered the Senate race against incumbent Francis Case in 1962. Prior to the election Case died and was replaced in Washington by Rapid City attorney Joe Bottom, who subsequently won a bitter struggle for the Republican nomination. McGovern defeated him in November in a close election eventually decided only after a recount.

In 1968 McGovern picked up the crusade of the assassinated Robert F. Kennedy in a belated bid for the presidency, but after the Democratic convention selected Hubert Humphrey instead, McGovern returned to South Dakota to win re-election to the Senate by trouncing former Governor Archie Gubbrud.

After losing the presidency to Richard Nixon two years later, McGovern gave serious thought to retiring from the Senate in 1974 (in part because of lingering bitterness over Nixon's 55%-45% mandate in South Dakota), but he decided to seek re-election against Republican Leo Thorsness, a Minnesota transplant who had won celebrity as a prisoner of war in Vietnam. Primarily a referendum on Vietnam that attracted national attention, McGovern won a surprisingly comfortable victory in a hawkish and predominantly Republican state, thus becoming the first Democrat in South Dakota history to serve three terms in the Senate.

McGovern leaned toward retiring from the Senate again in 1980, until the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) targeted him as a prime candidate for defeat in its effort to revamp the Senate with conservatives. Never one to back away from a challenge, McGovern announced for re-election on February 18, 1980, while Republicans were still deciding upon an opponent. This time they produced four-term congressman Jim Abnor, a 58-year-old bachelor short on accomplishments in the Congress but blessed with a "nice guy" image. McGovern



was doomed by a combination of factors, not just NCPAC or the Right-to-Life coalition (though they still like to take credit for McGovern's defeat). A primary bid in 1980, the first McGovern had ever encountered, revealed the erosion of support he had sustained in his own party. Despite the words of the credit-takers of the world, however, McGovern's fate would have been no different if there had been no primary. Many South Dakotans deserted him because they saw Abnor as a nice man, others because McGovern's liberalism made him a natural scapegoat in the year of Ronald Reagan. When the voters cut short his career, McGovern had equaled the late Karl Mundt for length of service to South Dakota in Congress, twenty two years, four in the House and eighteen in the Senate.

In his first campaign in 1956, McGovern put out one button, a 1½" blue and white "McGovern for Congress" picture litho. This button, a standard design used during the period by Hubert Humphrey and other congressional candidates, was not the creation of McGovern, but it became a significant factor in the survival of his campaign. In an effort to raise funds, McGovern and campaign advisor George Cunningham often found themselves short on money as they campaigned in the district. They occasionally had to sell the buttons for a dollar each door-to-door to fill



their gas tank so they could travel to the next town! According to Cunningham, about ten thousand of the buttons were issued, although there was no plan to sell them until it became necessary.

In 1958 McGovern issued two buttons, another 1½" blue and white picture lithograph that read "I'm for Congressman George McGovern," issued in a quantity of ten thousand, and the rarest of all McGovern locals, a 2¼" red, white and blue picture celluloid reading "I'm for McGovern for Congress." As Cunningham remembers it,

"McGovern used to sit in a booth at the Lawler Hotel in Mitchell drawing out different designs for buttons on placemats. A lot of them never got made, but he was always interested in playing around with different ideas. This cello was actually the first one he designed himself. When McGovern got the design down, we took it to the manufacturer and decided to put celluloid on it to make it more attractive. That wasn't very commonly used in those days, so we thought we could jazz it up a little and sell it as a fundraising item. As it turned out, we paid 18¢ each to make them and charged \$1 each for them. It was kind of a bust, though. People just weren't in the habit of having to pay for campaign buttons back then. They were something people expected the candidates to give away. So it didn't result in a lot of money for the campaign."

Unfortunately for collectors, Cunningham recalls that most of these buttons "were tossed out after the campaign because we just didn't get much out of them."

In his first Senate bid in 1960, McGovern again issued a standard design with picture, a "McGovern for Senate" celluloid in red, white, blue and black. Seven thousand were produced, but the button remains scarce in the hobby (bearing a \$50 guide price in a November, 1982, auction). A tab was also given out in 1960. A celluloid similar to the 1960 item, except for a different photograph and color scheme (the left panel is blue instead of red), was issued in 1962 during McGovern's successful race against Joe Bottom.

Although a greater quantity (ten thousand) appeared, the 1962 version is considered the scarcer of the two. A "McGovern for U. S. Senator" tab was also produced, as was a 1" blue on white "McGovern is Tops" litho. According to George Cunningham, "McGovern took his pen and paper out and drew this one too. He knew people would be playing on the idea of his opponent's last name — Bottom — so he got the jump on them by putting out the button." More than fifteen thousand were issued and it still surfaces regularly at flea markets in South Dakota for \$5 or less, though prices in double figures are common in auctions.

The 1968 campaign was a drought for creative items. A trio of common lithos (blue on white, white on dark blue, and red on white) were first used in the 1968 presidential bid and then the Senate race, and a rather scarce white on light blue litho variety was apparently used only in the Senate contest. A "Republicans for McGovern" red on white celluloid, considered rare by collectors, was also issued in 1968 because of many requests for McGovern material by Republicans — an indication of his versatile appeal to his South Dakota constituents regardless of party.

In 1974 eighteen authentic varieties of McGovern buttons were produced. They included six special interest lithos, "Senior Citizens for McGovern," "Farmers for McGovern," "GOP for McGovern," "Veterans for McGovern," "Teachers for McGovern," and "Students for McGovern." A small ¾" blue on gold litho reading "McGovern 74" was issued, as were blue on silver and brown on gold lithos reading "Re-elect Senator McGovern" and "Re-elect Senator McGovern 1974." An orange on brown litho read "McGovern 74," a light blue and dark blue litho read "Re-elect Senator McGovern 74," and a series of white on blue lithos said "Re-elect Senator McGovern," "McGovern 74," and "McGovern." The "McGovern 74" variety was the only style that year designed personally by the candidate. As Cunningham recalls, "McGovern didn't get involved with it much in 1974 because he had just come off the presidential campaign, but he did sit down and draw out the 74 with the word 'McGovern' through it." It has been said McGovern wanted to downplay his incumbency in 1974 by not using the words "Senator" or "re-elect" on his material, but that was not the case. Most of his items, including buttons and bumperstickers, prominently echoed these references. This was wise, for as the campaign took shape the big issue was McGovern's sixteen years of experience in Congress vs. the complete inexperience of his opponent Leo Thorsness.

A small "McGovern 1974" orange and purple picture celluloid was also issued that year by one of his campaign supporters. A white, green and gold "Re-elect McGovern 1974" celluloid was also used, as was a rectangular tab. In addition, a "Badge-a-minit" item attributed by Cunningham to a supporter (and former APIC member) and not to the Senate campaign itself was made up, reportedly in a limited edition of fifteen. It features a full color photo of McGovern walking across the Capitol green, a photo also used on his office cards. A white on red "Re-elect the Senator" cello is in many collections as a McGovern button, but it was issued by the Democratic National Committee for use in several 1974 Senate races.

Cunningham has explained that the large variety of 1974 McGovern buttons was due to a 1972 contract McGovern had with the Green Duck Company. "They owed us a few favors. For every item they were hired to make in McGovern's presidential bid, we paid them to make a couple



thousand extra for us. So in 1974 they put out most of our buttons in all sizes and shapes, mostly to even out 1972." Cunningham also attributed the set of six special interest pins directly to McGovern, explaining, "McGovern wanted the specialty group items made — farmers, students, senior citizens, and so forth — because he wanted to demonstrate his wide appeal in the state. They were made by the thousands and we had quite a few of them left over when we cleaned out our offices after the 1980 campaign." Today, five of the six are very common, with the veterans' variety somewhat harder to find.

McGovern's final Senate bid in 1980 produced ten different buttons used officially in the campaign, four not linked to the re-election effort, and a button from Ted Kennedy's 1980 convention challenge to Jimmy Carter that became a quasi-McGovern item on election night. The earliest to surface were two picture buttons, a red, white and blue "George McGovern U. S. Senator 1980" and a black and white "Re-elect Senator McGovern 1980." Both were issued for the 1979 South Dakota State Fair, in part to counteract rumors that McGovern would not run again. Both are uncommon, as only two hundred of each were produced.

A set of three items appeared on announcement day, February 13, 1980. With McGovern believed to be behind in the polls, he wanted to come home to make his announcement in the Corn Palace in Mitchell, and field co-ordinator Judy Harrington and Mitchell field representative Cindy Kranz wanted to set the tone for the campaign with a successful kickoff. As it turned out, the event proved to be the highlight of the whole campaign, with more than two thousand supporters braving near-blizzard conditions for McGovern's announcement and a speech by Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia. For that box lunch event a commemorative red, white and blue 3" announcement button was given to each person. 2500 of them were made and most were given out that evening. Two others for sale at the event were the official McGovern '80 logo button designed by Harrington and a "McGovernment

by George" button that longtime McGovern aide Pat Donovan wanted made. It featured a slogan first used in the 1972 presidential campaign. Seven thousand of these two styles were run, a sufficient quantity to make them common among collectors, in contrast to the scarcer 3" commemorative button.

The one 1980 button designed personally by McGovern was the "Senator McGovern" '80 variety used as the standard headquarters giveaway button during the campaign; 10,000 were produced, but all eight campaign offices ran out before election day.

Near the end of the campaign came the "I'm with George" button, inspired by the fact that most of McGovern's constituents addressed him as "George" rather than a more formal title when they talked to him. Five thousand of these were produced for a fundraiser featuring New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley. At least half were left over after the campaign and were reportedly junked. The McGovern signature pins were commissioned by Judy Harrington, inspired by a 1978 Howard Baker signature button. 400 were printed on a silver background, but the paper did not hold well, so the remaining 600 were done on white paper. Both are uncommon (probably the rarest 1980 McGovern buttons except for the two 1979 State Fair buttons) and the signature button on silver is very difficult to find in good condition.

The 1980 sunflower button was ordered in a quantity of one thousand by Aberdeen field co-ordinator Dan Martin to use at Sunflower Days in Groton, South Dakota. Fifty of these were later sent to the Sioux Falls headquarters and similar quantities to offices in Watertown and Vermillion.

A legitimate button not used in the state was the "J'Aime George" pin made for a fundraiser in Paris by McGovern supporters. A vendor item designed by a collector was a jugate promoting Kennedy for president and McGovern for senator. George Cunningham was sold a few of these items in his Capitol office one day by someone who claimed that there were only a few available. He kept one for his own collection, as always, and sent the rest back to loyal supporters in South Dakota. They have become common among collectors, but were seldom (if ever) seen during the campaign. Cunningham told me that the Millenium Company produced samples of the "McGovern Courage '80" item when it was thought that McGovern might seek the presidency again in 1980. Again, Cunningham obtained a few for his South Dakota loyalists, but like the Kennedy-McGovern jugate eastern collectors wound up with the bulk of the run.

A full color picture button once offered in auction that featured the picture used on McGovern's 1980 campaign literature was never used in the state and never authorized by the McGovern campaign. The matching poster is authentic (and is regarded by McGovern as his favorite literature piece used in any of his local campaigns), but the button is bogus.

A McGovern defeat was evident early on election night. In his boiler room his workers (some from other states who had worked earlier in Kennedy's 1980 presidential effort) waited for McGovern to appear at the headquarters. After a brief talk, they went upstairs as a group to meet with the media and loyalists to concede the election. The supporters who were veterans of the Kennedy campaign went to their desks, took out their little "the dream shall never die" white on blue buttons, pinned them on their lapels, and walked with McGovern to meet his public.★

"Arms Are For Embracing"

THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT

by Roger Fischer

On June 12, 1982, an estimated 700,000 men, women, and children from the far corners of the United States congregated in New York to demonstrate their support for a bilateral freeze on the deployment of American and Soviet nuclear weapons. As the vast throng—larger than the crowds that bade farewell to Lou Gehrig or cheered "Lucky" Lindbergh, two popes, the Apollo astronauts, or the 1969 Mets—marched from the United Nations into Midtown Manhattan, many sang the plaintive "Give Peace a Chance." Others chanted, "One, two, three, four, we don't want a nuclear war; five, six, seven, eight, we don't want to radiate." Sheet banners and placards bore such slogans as "Arms Are For Embracing," "War is Sick and Insane," "No More," and "End the Arms Race, Save the Human Race." As the multitude moved on to Central Park for an afternoon of anti-war music and speeches, a visibly moved veteran of the Vietnam protests a decade ago said to a bystander, "Sure seems like old times."

The differences between the upheaval over Vietnam and the recent freeze movement are enormous, of course. The dissent over Vietnam was intensely ideological, essentially angry, and youth-oriented, more than anything else a creature of campus activism and the counter-culture it begat and nurtured. Its spokesmen (Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, the brothers Berrigan and the rest) and its penchant for the theatre of the outrageous (burning of draft cards and flags, despoiling draft records with blood and human waste) polarized the nation and pushed many moderates into reluctant support of presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. In the last analysis, the anti-war movement of the '60s and early '70s was largely unsuccessful, for our adventure in Southeast Asia finally fell victim to its gigantic cost in dollars and lives and its repeated failure to reach "the light at the end of the tunnel." In contrast, the freeze movement has attracted disciples of all ages, mainly from the great middle class. It owes more to the crackerbarrel democracy of Vermont town meetings than to our Berkeleys, Ann Arbers, and Columbias. It has been so noncontroversial and mannerly that a scoffer described it as "a mom and apple-pie movement." Its essential emotion seems to be not rage but hope. As one June 12 participant told Newsweek, "It is hope in the midst of our possibility that everything will die." And, given its amazing growth in the last year and a half, indications are that the nuclear freeze movement may well exert a measurable influence on American and world politics.

Yet on the surface it did indeed seem like "old times" in New York on June 12—the marching, the music, the color of people and banners and badges, above all the excitement and sense of moral purpose after a decade of drift for the peace crusade in the United States. Even since Richard Nixon finally removed the last American soldiers from Vietnam a decade ago, the peace movement has been in



disarray for lack of a compelling and unifying issue. Salt II had not captured the public imagination, opposition to the draft struck many thoughtful pacifists as a self-serving ploy to exploit the poor, our problem in Iran set the cause of anti-colonialism back eons, and our recent bid to make El Salvador safe for its military junta proved too fleeting to generate much organized protest. After the onset of detente with the Soviets, the anti-nuclear movement shifted from its early "ban-the-bomb" phase to a virtually total preoccupation with domestic nuclear energy, especially in the wake of Three Mile Island. But now, for the first time in ten years, world peace was once again a mass phenomenon sufficiently compelling to support the great public demonstrations of the Vietnam era.

Major credit for the sudden popularity of the freeze proposal must go to Ronald Reagan. Although by the end of 1980 the combined American and Soviet arsenals had grown to more than 17,500 intercontinental nuclear warheads with a cumulative destructive force exceeding eleven thousand



NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS



megatons, enough to destroy each other many times over, most Americans were not especially concerned. The two superpowers had not been close to direct confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis, the softening of Cold War rhetoric under the detente initiatives of Nixon and Henry Kissinger had soothed anxieties, and the negotiations that led to two strategic arms limitation treaties indicated that the "mutual balance of terror" could be defused by international diplomacy. Moreover, the Soviets remained too menacing for most Americans to take seriously peace movement proposals for unilateral disarmament or even for bilateral disarmament without verification. Well aware of this, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies Director Randall Forsberg wrote up in late 1979 a rather moderate proposal calling for a bilateral, verifiable freeze (but not immediate disarmament) in American and Soviet nuclear weapons. It was endorsed by representatives of some thirty peace groups at a summit sponsored by the Fellowship of Reconciliation in January, 1980. Despite its moderation, the freeze failed to come even close to winning endorsement by the 1980 Democratic convention and gave every indication of being a dead issue until the inauguration of Ronald Reagan.

If Reagan's truculent red-baiting during the campaign was largely dismissed as typical conservative campaign rhetoric, it soon became clear that Reagan and many of the right-wing ideologues he brought to Washington did in fact regard the Soviet Union as a sinister, almost demonic regime that had to be held in check by any means necessary. To be fair to the Reaganites, they had ample cause for concern. In recent years the Russians had dramatically increased their nuclear arsenal to more than twice the megatonnage of the United States' and were behaving very much like neo-Stalinists in Afghanistan and Poland. So Reagan and his administration responded by rejecting arms

limitations, proposing to remedy an alleged "window of vulnerability" with a whopping \$240 billion in new weapons, and increasingly sabre-rattling statements of the sort not heard since the mellowing of Nikita Khrushchev after 1962. Even more disquieting, such self-styled "realists" in the Reagan administration as National Security Council staffer Richard Pipes, Undersecretary of Defense Thomas Jones, and consultant Colin Gray began to speak of nuclear war as not only thinkable but winnable. Reagan himself categorically refused to rule out a pre-emptive first strike against the Soviets and topsider Edwin Meese described nuclear war lamely as "something that may not be desirable."

The Reaganauts may or may not have given the Kremlin a scare, but they unquestionably frightened the daylight out of a large number of Americans. Almost instantly, the idea of a bilateral freeze gained credibility. In March, 1981, eighteen Vermont town meetings endorsed the notion, followed this year by 161 more. To join such old pillars of the peace movement as the American Friends Service Committee, Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, a host of new organizations emerged to promote the freeze. Roger Molander and his twin brother Emil founded Ground Zero, a group that sponsored programs in more than six hundred communities last April to demonstrate the effects of a nuclear detonation. Physicians for Social Responsibility's more than ten thousand doctors are led by Australian-born pediatrician Helen Caldicott, who left her post at Harvard to devote full time to "the ultimate form of preventive medicine." Parenting in a Nuclear Age was the brainstrom of an Oakland mother whose young daughter was having nightmares of a nuclear holocaust. The United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War was formed to try to revive the



collegiate enthusiasm of an earlier generation of students.

The freeze idea has spread like wildfire during the last year and a half. By last June it had been endorsed by more than three hundred New England town meetings and many city councils, county commissions, and state legislatures from coast to coast. Organizing efforts were under way in all but seven states. Polls revealed that 43% of Americans had heard about the freeze and more than two thirds of those approved of the idea. The American religious community responded to the freeze with enthusiasm, including the often conservative Catholic bishops and the generally pro-Reagan Mormon hierarchy in Utah. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom began an ambitious drive to collect the signatures of a million American women on STAR ("Stop the Arms Race") cards pledging support for the freeze. A dollar collected with each card is financing administration and planned TV commercials featuring such celebrities as Joanne Woodward and Marlo Thomas. The STAR cards will be collected at WILPF headquarters in Philadelphia until March 8, 1983 (International Women's Day), then delivered to the White House and to NATO headquarters in Brussels.

More direct political action was also under way. Organizers in Reagan's California, led by millionaire Harold Willens, were gathering the 750,000 signatures needed to put the freeze on the November ballot. Similar petition drives were under way in Arizona, Michigan, Montana, Oregon, North Dakota and the District of Columbia; and state legislatures in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Wisconsin voted to do the same in those states. Meanwhile, similar efforts were being organized in three dozen or more individual cities and counties, prompting one freeze publicist to claim, "This is the closest equivalent to a national referendum in the history of the United States." While this activity was unfolding at the grassroots level,

proposals promoting the freeze were being spearheaded in the Senate by Ted Kennedy and Mark Hatfield and in the House by Wisconsin Democrat Clement Zablocki.












Perhaps the most remarkable facet of the freeze movement up to this point was the lack of serious opposition it had engendered. After early dismissals of the freeze as pie-in-the-sky, the Reagan administration launched a brief offensive against it (implying that it was a blueprint for Soviet world domination) and then abandoned direct oppositions in favor of such efforts to co-opt the movement as Reagan's START proposal. Beliefs that "the people participating in this area are dupes of Soviet policy, well intentioned as they may be," as a retired army officer living in Arizona put it, were unquestionably strengthened by the late Leonid Brezhnev's endorsement of the nuclear freeze at the United Nations in June. Congressman William Dickinson of Alabama claimed that the disinformation division of the KGB was responsible for the concept! But the White House did little to combat the freeze until the number of state and local initiatives began to proliferate and until it appeared likely that the freeze might well win endorsement by the House of Representatives. By late July, the Reagan counter-offensive was in high gear.

The "Great Communicator's" allegations that the freeze proponents were unwitting pawns of the Soviets inspired outrage in the liberal community and some superb cartoons linking Reagan to the late Joseph McCarthy, but they were sufficiently effective to prevent the Kennedy-Hatfield proposal from reaching the floor of the Republican Senate and then, on August 5, to narrowly defeat the Zablocki measure in the House. A substitute motion (endorsing the Reagan START talks instead of a freeze) was defeated as voting ceased, but Pennsylvania Republicans Lawrence Coughlin and James Coyne belatedly switched their votes to produce a 204-202 squeaker for the substitute.



US/Soviet Nuclear FREEZE

New Jersey Freeze Campaign Mrs. Katherine Newburger Treas. 554 Bloomfield Ave. Bloomfield, N.J. 07003



Administration efforts to derail the freeze movement fared much worse at the grassroots level. On September 14, Wisconsin primary voters endorsed the freeze by a lopsided margin of more than three to one, 631,375-202,245. On the same day the citizens of Brattleboro, Vermont, approved a freeze 1584-335. A week later Golden, Colorado, did likewise and on October 5, three of four Alaska cities followed suit. On November 2, the freeze was rejected in conservative Arizona and in two small counties in Arkansas and Colorado, but carried in every other city and county where it was on the ballot; it won landslide victories in Montana, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia and eked out a 52%-48% mandate in California. Efforts to defeat it were concentrated primarily in Reagan's home state, where such luminaries as Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Reagan national security czar William Clark were among the heavy White House artillery brought out to defeat the proposal. On the winning side in California was Patti Davis, daughter of the president!

If buttons and other memorabilia are any barometer of public sentiment, Patti certainly speaks for more Americans than does her father. Apart from some crudely produced "Russia Wants You" anti-freeze posters used by a Republican youth group, the only item I have seen promoting the Reagan position is the "NUCLEAR FREEZE/Sellout by the Same People who soldout Viet Nam" button manufactured by Wendell's. In contrast, the pro-freeze forces have been extraordinarily prolific in generating material. Valley Stream, New York, producer Larry Fox (APIC #6233), a leading supplier of anti-nuclear and peace items for more than a decade, reported in early summer that his workers were putting in double shifts to

meet demand. New York cause collector Marshall Levin (APIC # 844) was able to add 224 different buttons to his collection during the June rally and encountered many others he had already obtained! Subsequent activities in referendum states and elsewhere have added to the total.

Like most contemporary cause material, freeze objects tend to be colorful and imaginative, quite eclectic both in graphics and rhetoric. Favored symbolic devices are the peace logo, the dove of peace (often perched in human hands, inspired no doubt by an American Friends Service Committee "The Future in Our Hands" celluloid widely distributed at an early date), the nuclear bomb (broken, being kicked, or with diagonal red line), and the logo of the United Nations special session on disarmament, a man breaking a rifle superimposed upon a globe. Slogans run the gamut from fervent desperation ("SAVE OUR PLANET EARTH," "SIT-IN FOR SURVIVAL," "choose life so that your children will live") to tongue-in-cheek satire ("TAKE THE TOYS AWAY FROM THE BOYS," "IF YOU'VE SEEN ONE NUCLEAR WAR, YOU'VE SEEN THEM ALL," "NUCLEAR WAR can spoil your whole day"). Regardless of the success or failure of the movement in the months and years ahead, the crusade for a bilateral freeze on American and Soviet nuclear weapons has already added a rich dimension to the material culture of American protest.

Editor's Note: The Keynoter is indebted to Larry Fox (Box M, Valley Stream, NY 11582), to Clay Colt (Donnelly/Colt Buttons, Box 271, New Vernon, NJ 07976), and to Mary Zepernick, Membership Coordinator for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (1213 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19101) for their generosity with materials and information to make this feature possible.★



Books In The Hobby

by Roger Fischer

Stan Gores, *Presidential and Campaign Memorabilia, with Prices* (Wallace-Homestead Book Company, 1912 Grand Avenue, Des Moines, Iowa 50305, 1982), 156 pages, 416 illustrations, \$12.95.

Stan Gores (APIC #5384), managing editor of the *Fond du Lac (Wisconsin) Reporter* and for nearly twenty years an avid collector of three-dimensional political items, has produced a volume that is well written, handsomely illustrated, and reasonably priced. It would make an excellent gift for any collector of political Americana, especially those whose horizon is not limited to pinback buttons. It should be stressed at the outset that this isn't a volume that will be defined as "vital" or "definitive" to the hobby in the sense that Ted Hake's more comprehensive trilogy is. It does not compete with Edmund B. Sullivan's *Collecting Political Americana* for provocative insights or with the Collins volume on textiles or the DeWitt/Sullivan

work on badges and medalets for thorough item survey study. Its major value to collectors is its more than four hundred crisp illustrations (including twenty-two color plates) of political items, mostly 3-D material dear to Gores' heart, including some truly "off-beat" pieces rarely if ever seen by most collectors. Unlike such surveys as Marian Klamkin's volume on ceramics or Bessie Lindsey's on political glass, *Presidential and Campaign Memorabilia* is eclectic in its scope and not marred by error-filled historical narrative. The commentary is sprightly and the illustrations of memorabilia consistently well done. Gores' text and illustrations are too heavily weighted toward the men who achieved the presidency and his decision to feature buttons in fewer than one per cent of the illustrations (four in all) — with similar neglect toward tokens and other forerunners of pinbacks — will limit appreciation of this volume in our fraternity. Nevertheless, he has given us a volume that should find a welcomed place on the bookshelves of most collectors.★



NEWS

COMMITTEE REPORT: **Special Membership Rates For Students**

This is the report of the Committee to Review Special Membership Rates for Students.

While virtually all those asked to provide guidance feel that some special effort should be made to interest students in political memorabilia and to attract them to APIC membership, no one feels that a reduction in rates could stimulate enough new memberships to offset an increase in the cost of our operation.

There were some suggestions for a trial or pilot study which could be evaluated after two years, and the membership may wish to pursue this. However, this would necessitate the development of a model and a good deal more evidence that this direction is consistent with membership objectives.

Most committee members are concerned with the logistics involved maintaining two sets of membership records, as well as the anticipated loss of revenue and increase in costs.

One of the questions that surfaced was the rate for present membership: \$16.00 per annum. This, on reflection, seems very low. (A full membership dues level of \$25.00 and a student membership of \$12.50 might obviate the questions of logistics. At that point only the principle of multiple classes of membership would remain.) But this committee was not asked to review the present membership dues level. Only the question of student memberships was addressed.

In summary, the committee feels some effort should be made to tell young people about our hobby and to interest them in pursuing it through APIC. Almost no one feels that this can be achieved in a reduction in membership rates to students without creating even greater problems for the organization.

It is my recommendation, and I feel the sense of the committee, that we adopt a resolution that would formalize a program for young people. This could take a number of different forms: 1) A slide presentation or video tape on American political history through political memorabilia 2) A special soft-cover publication which could be distributed to high schools, youth clubs, etc., at cost 3) An increased effort to develop a speakers bureau for appearances in classrooms. There are, of course, other approaches.

Although not addressed by the committee, once an approach is formalized and presented to the membership, it might be possible to charge an assessment on full membership (\$1.00? \$2.00?) in order to help fund the project.

Respectfully submitted,

Albert G. Salter
APIC #4736

American Political Items Collectors

INCORPORATED 1974

1982 APIC FINANCIAL STATEMENT

January 1, 1982, Cash Balance	\$ 53.62
Reserve Fund	2,758.76
(Includes \$476.50 in 1982 dues received in 1981)	

Income:

1982 Dues Income	31,829.50
Mailing Supply Service Income	746.75
Miscellaneous Income	715.95
Interest Income	930.45
1983 Dues Income	144.00
Total 1982 Income	34,366.65
	\$37,179.03

Expenditures:

Keynoter Editor Expense	484.90
Spring 1983 Keynoter Expense	3,075.00
Mailing Supply Service Expense	268.69
APIC Roster Binders (1500)	2,260.70
Miscellaneous Expenses	388.88
Moving Expenses	655.83
Office Expenses	338.33
Photographic Expenses	125.03
Postage Expenses	3,960.44
Printing Expenses	20,734.61
Secretary Stipend	399.32
Telephone Expenses	120.20
Total Expenditures	34,883.93

Reserve Fund Balance	1,225.64
Cash Balance, Eisenhower Nat'l Bank	69.46
	\$37,179.03

Joseph D. Hayes

Joseph D. Hayes
Secretary

Ken Hosner Named To APIC Board

APIC President Bob Fratkin announced that Ken Hosner (APIC #1633) has been nominated and approved for membership on the APIC Board of Directors. Ken will serve the remainder of this term in place of Linda Adams, who resigned recently to meet increased personal obligations. "While Ken's knowledge and experience can only add to the Board's broad representation of collecting interests," Fratkin said, "Linda's viewpoint and sincere efforts will be sorely missed."

Items of Interest

APIC Receives Tax Exemption

On December 7, 1982, APIC's legal representative, Kevin Lipson, an attorney with Morgan, Lewis and Bockius, informed President Bob Fratkin that the IRS had approved APIC as an exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Kevin, an APIC member since 1972, has worked on the complicated application for nearly a year. The costs of his services, and those of other tax and legal experts at Morgan, Lewis and Bockius, were entirely underwritten by the firm on a "pro bono" basis, but no amount of compensation could adequately repay Kevin for his extensive efforts on APIC's behalf. Kevin's letter to Bob Fratkin follows:

Dear Bob:

I am pleased to inform you that the Internal Revenue Service has made an advance determination that the American Political Items Collectors, Inc. (APIC) is an exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. This determination is effective from the date of the filing of our application for exemption on July 22, 1982.

The effects of this determination are far-reaching. Membership payments, to the extent that they exceed the value of benefits received, may be deducted by the contributor as a charitable contribution. Additionally, gifts of political memorabilia, cash, or other property may be contributed directly to the APIC by interested persons. Such contributions will be deductible by the contributor as charitable contributions. APIC members should consult with their accountant, tax advisor, or attorney to determine the manner in which charitable contributions to the APIC would be most beneficial to them.

By approving the exemption, the Internal Revenue Service has expressly recognized the historical and educational importance of the preservation of political memorabilia and artifacts. Congratulations.


Very truly yours,

Kevin J. Lipson

This 1 1/4" Davis-Bryan jugate is a recent spectacular discovery for the hobby. The only "message" jugate and one of only 5 known 1 1/4" buttons for the Davis campaign, this item was used for the Utah State Democratic Convention in Salt Lake City, August 27, 1924. The ribbon also contains the slogan of the campaign, "Better Days With Davis."



Two copies of this interesting 1 3/4" 1900 McKinley button have been found recently in widely separate parts of the country. A multicolor cartoon button, it shows McKinley and T.R. preventing Bryan from taking down the American flag flying over the Philippines.



McGovern Bumper Stickers

**1983
APIC National Convention
Sheraton O'Hare Hotel
Chicago — August 10-13**

